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The human and political economic history of sub-Saharan Africa 
is one of evolving and developing poverty and hunger - a 
process highlighted by the sub-continent's disastrous 1979-83 
experience and weak subsequent stabilisation. The 'loud 
crisis' of the early 1980s has led to two main responses: the 
new conventional wisdom of stabilisation and structural 
adjustment and the expanded old immediate response of 
emergency survival assistance. Both -. separately or together 
- are incomplete and almost certainly, inadequate to the task 
of attaining development which overcomes poverty. The former 
is too abstractedly macro and fails either to treat human 
investment and immediate welfare seriously or to recognise 
that production and distribution are basically co-determined, 
not sequential. The latter is too episodic and too little 
oriented to tackling a series of challenges to survival as the 
first steps toward rehabilitation and development. Arguably 
elements for reformulating and building from each (and both) 
toward a short and medium term political economic strategy to 
overcome poverty through development are 'Within African 
Reach 1.
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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: POVERTY OF DEVELOPMENT, DEVELOPMENT OF 
POVERTY
Reginald Herbold Green
Sweet and cloying through the dark air 
Falls the stifling scent of despair;
The forms take shape in the dark air:
Puss-purr of leopard, footfall of padding bear 
Palm-pat of nodding ape, square hyena waiting 
For laughter, laughter, laughter. The Lords of hell 
are here.
- T. S. Eliot
What do you want to be when you grow up?
Alive.
- UNICEF African Poster 1985
Do not go gentle into that good night...
But rage rage against the dying of the light.
- Dylan Thomas
I. Introduction
The struggle against poverty and for human conditions of life 
by and for poor people is neither a new one, limited to the
poor countries of the South nor a static one. Participation 
in it, from the Temple Commission on UK unemployment in the
1930s through the early days of the United Nations' economic 
development effort beginning at the end of the 1940s, and the 
International Labour Organsisation's World Employment 
Programme in the 1970s to his present service with UNICEF, has 
been an abiding and integral part of Hans Singer's devotion to 
applied economics as a vocation - economics in its original 
Old Testament sense of stewardship and meeting material 
needs.1/ Nor is Hans a newcomer to Africa - from the founding 
of the Economic Commission for Africa as the 1950s turned into 
the 1960s, through the 1970s Kenya ILO Employment Mission to 
the 1984 UNICEF State of the World's Children Report and study 
of the impact of the depression on children in Africa (Singer
and Green, 1984) there is a span of 25 years of work.
Over that period sub-Saharan Africa has become independent; 
begun to grapple with both poverty and productivity; appeared 
to achieve (in a majority of states) a real if limited and 
imperfect development momentum; and, since the end of the 
1970s, fallen into sustained economic unsuccess in all but a 
small minority of countries.2/
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That unsuccess has usually been sketched in terms of 
macroeconomic or political-economic aggregate levels and 
trends (for example in World Bank, World Development Reports 
and in the bulk of the contributions to the sources cited in 
fn. 2) and flashed on television screens in images of mass 
starvation. The first abstracts from, and anaesthetises 
against, the human meaning of economic disintegration 
penury, hunger, illness, plague, societal breakdown (at least 
the outriders and forward projected shadows of the four 
horsemen of the apocalypse). The latter numbs by its hammer 
blows of horror and creates a situation in which the struggle 
to meet the immediate necessity of maintaining life can push 
aside the need to alter the conditions which in their extreme 
form endanger life on a mass basis, but in their more general 
and more persistent manifestations erode, degrade and shorten 
it in less dramatic but no less damnable ways.
The reactions to economic unsuccess in sub-Saharan Africa have 
been dominated by two lines:
a. the 'new conventional wisdom'3/ centred on IMF 
stabilisation and World Bank structural adjustment 
models; and
b. the emergency famine relief focus on keeping human beings 
alive.
The need to balance resources used with resources available - 
stabilisation - is irrefutable. No economy can avoid 
stabilisation indefinitely and multi-term, massive imbalance 
leads to conditions at least as deadly to human welfare as to 
GDP growth. The basic questions are ones of distribution of 
costs, timing and - most critical - the relevant roles of
cutting resource use versus increasing domestic (produced) and 
external (transferred) resource supply. Similarly, structural 
adjustment to raise production and productivity generally, and 
in particular to improve the balance of external resources and 
food availability relative to requirements, is not itself 
controversial. Especially in very poor countries, even though 
growth without development is all too possible development 
without growth is not. However, it is not the same thing to 
affirm that production is essential and to encapsulate that 
advice as 'Seek ye first the kingdom of production and all
else shall be added unto you'. There are very real questions 
of distribution (dominantly turning on who is able to produce 
what, not on subsequent transfer payments), of basic service 
levels (both in respect to minimum humanly acceptable 
standards and to ability to produce) and of timimg of gains as 
opposed to costs (poor people have very narrow survival 
margins and it is a brutal fact that the poor are dead in the 
short, not even the long, run).
The emergency efforts to avoid mass death do relate to an
immediate overriding necessity. For the dead there is no
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future. By themselves they do not answer what one is keeping 
people alive for in the sense of what they will be able to 
make of their lives. Mass starvation in sub-Saharan Africa to 
date has been triggered by the interaction of drought, weak 
transport systems and war (and threatened, albeit to date 
averted, when the first two interacted particularly savagely).
But it has been triggered both because the margin between 
'normal' food supply and starvation is narrow, and 
increasingly narrowing in a majority of the region's 
countries, and because most poor households have neither the 
self employment nor wage employment opportunity either to grow 
enough to eat or to be productive and well rewarded enough to 
buy adequate food. In normal years inability to buy food - 
not its physical scarcity - is the main cause of urban 
malnutrition (cf. Reutlinger 1985). That reality underlies 
the famine crises and remains even when reasonable rains 
return (see Please 1985; Green 1985b) - as they did in many, 
not all, drought affected areas in the 1984-85 cropping 
seasons. Furthermore, peasants who have lost herds, tools, 
seed and other means of farming, especially if also driven 
from their homes into urban areas or relief camps by the 
search for food cannot resume production as if nothing had 
happened. Flight from the land will be both difficult and 
slow (cf. Burki 1985).
Persistent, Developing Poverty
Neither of these two approaches directly addresses the 
challenge of persistent and developing poverty. Even when 
many sub-Saharan Africa economies had positive per capita 
output growth not reversed by negative terms of trade shifts, 
absolute poverty at best declined slowly as a proportion of 
total population and even then often rose in absolute numbers 
of human beings affected. Similarly, basic service expansion 
while very real is - with the partial exception of primary 
education - very far from achieving universal access in most 
SSA states. In SSA the extent of malnutrition defined as not 
enough calories for an active working life rose in 1980 to 44 
per cent of the population - 150 mn human beings - while 25 
per cent (90 mn) were also below the calories needed to avert 
stunted growth and serious health risk. Both the percentages 
and the absolute numbers represented deterioration since 1970 
(World Bank 1986; Reutlinger 1985). The 1970s concerns with 
employment (for example the World Employment Programme's 
country teams such as the one to Kenya), peasant productivity, 
the 'informal sector', basic service access, distribution and 
enabling the poor to become less poor by producing more (or 
being more fairly paid) , related to very real human and 
economic problems. They self-evidently remain valid in the 
1980s as absolute poverty rises and basic services decay, even 
if the somewhat reductionist emphasis on productivity and 
survival has for the time being swept them to the margins of 
dialogue and - with exceptions - of resource allocation. The 
concern with persistent poverty is not a new one in economics
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nor one associated solely with particular ideologies. It was, 
after all, Adam Smith who made it a premise that no nation 
could be great and prosperous if the majority of its people 
were poor and miserable.
The weakness of conventional stabilisation and structural 
adjustment strategies is not their focus on regaining balance 
between resource availability and use, still less their 
insistence on the need to increase and to alter the makeup of 
production to achieve and to sustain balance. It is the
absence of two additional priorities which is open to 
question. These are:
a. non-deferral of meeting basic needs - with special 
reference to food, water, health and education;
b. priority to increasing productivity of and access to 
services by poor people and vulnerable groups.
There is no reason to assume that these goals are either 
economic or socio political nonsense. The enormous cost of
inadequate diet in terms of health, ability to benefit from
education, capacity to work hard in lost present and future
output terms is increasingly widely recognised (cf. Reutlinger 
1985; World Bank 1986; UNICEF 1985b). Similarly, the social
disintegration and political instability caused by the 
immiserisation of growing numbers of people who were formerly 
productive, non-destitute members of their societies and 
economies has high potential economic costs; active in the 
cases of disorder and insurrection, passive in those of 
retreat from involvement in state policy and reversion to an 
'each for himself and the devil take the hindmost' variant of 
economic and social neo-anarchy.
The weaknesses of emergency relief efforts are rather 
different. They do recognise that basic needs cannot be
deferred and that helping human beings stay alive matters. 
What they have failed to do in the past is to pose two further 
questions:
a. how can these people have a future - and what kind of one
- after their lives have been saved?
b. how can emergency aid be designed and utilised as a first 
step toward self re-establishment including 
increased/restored production/earned income by the 
recipients?
Bob Geldof's horrified comments on the need to consider what 
Band Aid was keeping people alive for (i.e. what human 
condition they faced) illustrates the growing concern with the 
first question. The second has been nibbled at both by 
analysts and practitioners but main line action remains to 
treat it as unhandleable because emergencies are 
unpredictable, time short and relief logically separable from
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development.
II. Transitions From Poverty To Poverty: An Historical
Perspective
Poverty in sub-Saharan Africa is an historic fact - as it is 
virtually universally. There was no golden age before the 
Europeans came when the land flowed with sorghum, millet and 
yams, with guinea fowl, cattle and fish, with palm oil, 
groundnuts and garden eggs, with banana beer, coconut spirits 
and palm wine so that all were well fed and prosperous. But 
it would be equally false to treat poverty as primordial, 
unchanging and - implicitly - permanently immutable and 
inevitable.
Pre-colonial poverty turned primarily on sub-marginal or 
erratic rainfall and on technological (and therefore 
productivity) limitations in relation to sub-Saharan Africa's 
poor and difficult soils. The human condition was equally 
constrained by inadequate health knowledge, practices and 
services which shortened life and eroded strength. Africans, 
not Europeans, have always been the chief victims of African 
diseases and so-called adult African resistance to, for 
example, malaria often means no more (and no less) than that 
vulnerable individuals died of it as children.
None of this denies that Africans did develop technologies: 
some long fallow rotation systems (so-called 'shifting 
cultivation') related admirably and sustainably to poor soils 
with limited, uncertain rainfall so long as populations were 
small and the only large demand on the land was for food; some 
herbal and para-psychological medical practices were far more
than common sense or trial and error. Still less does it deny
cultural and social achievements. The fact remains that for 
many Africans hunger was an annual occurrence, disease a 
frequent one, life short, and death an ever present danger 
unleashed by unpredictable and technologically unmanageable 
weather shifts and outbreaks of disease.
Pre-colonial neo-colonialism - of slave traders and merchants 
manipulating African polities and agents - unleashed two 
additional causes of poverty and human misery. The first was
the slave trade and the social and economic wastelands it
created (still writ plain in the low present population of 
most of Nigeria's middle belt almost a century after that 
trade ceased) . The second was the rise in the number and 
ferocity of wars - and the killing power available to armies - 
largely directly or indirectly triggered by European and, 
secondarily, Arabian interventions (see Rodney 1972).
Colonialism in Africa rarely meant territorial economic 
development even in modern macroeconomic terms. Gross 
territorial product - as opposed to certain products of use to 
the colonising power and its trading partners - was rarely of
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central concern. James Mill's definition of a colony as a 
place in which the colonising power found it convenient to 
carry out some of its business (e.g. mining, cutting tropical 
timber, buying or growing tropical crops) provides much more 
insight into the nature of economic policy than any definition 
presupposing that colonies were seen primarily as territorial 
economic units in their own right.4/
As a direct result, African poverty was not an economic 
concern which could appear on the colonial agenda as more than 
a footnote. A large export sector with a supporting food and 
service sector could on occasion reduce poverty - a result not 
unwelcome to many colonial administrators. Avoiding mass 
starvation (by price juggling, reserve holding, famine relief 
and even food for work policies which have a haunting 
familiarity of kind if not scale to 1970s and 1980s efforts) 
were sometimes priorities - e.g. in the then Tanganyika 
Mandate - and did end mass starvation. But Adam Smith's 
dictum on the need for the majority to be non-poor and 
non-miserable as a pre-condition for colonial economic success 
would have been either incomprehensible or seen as at least as 
subversive as the writings of Karl Marx.5/
Education for Africans was perceived either as a by-product of 
missionary endeavour (vaguely backed, tolerated or curtailed 
in terms of its supposed social and political impact - which 
was usually far more and far more deeply 'subversive' than 
colonial administrators, or missionaries!, realised) or as an 
investment in clerks, semi-skilled labour and other human 
intermediate inputs into the colonial economy. The
calculations were not in sophisticated econometric terms, but 
colonial education policy was early (and severely cost 
constrained) human resource development school in concept - 
even when it flowered to secondary and medical assistant 
levels. Health facilities for Africans (and until late in the 
colonial period often for Europeans^/) were even more exiguous 
and dependent on missionary subsidisation of the colonial 
state.
However, the nature of poverty changed. Colonial rule did 
reduce death from war (caused by dislocation and subsequent 
starvation or epidemic disease more than by battle 
casualties) ; it did end the slave trade; frequently it did 
provide fail-safe famine relief against mass starvation. 
These shifts probably both increased life expectancy and (by 
reducing dislocation) raised rates of increase of food 
production. Exploitative as it was, colonial production 
promotion/coercion on average probably raised the command of 
many African households over goods and services. While there 
were exceptions (especially in the case of settler colonies), 
the territories in which most Africans were most likely to be 
poor and miserable were those like then Haute Volta in which, 
a la Joan Robinson's formulation, the colonial power and its 
enterprises could find no worthwhile way of exploiting them.
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Poverty - or at least human deprivation - was also altered in 
its nature in additional ways. The first was the imposition 
of external rule with its impact on polity, society, self 
image and self set standards - clearly a negative shift. The 
second was the beginnings of education and health services 
which both improved the human condition of recipients and gave 
them - and other Africans - a fuller picture of what they were 
(for whatever reason) still deprived of. The third was an 
increase in population growth (presumably related to the 
indirect effects of law and order including famine relief and 
ability to produce more) which began to create pressure on 
land of plausible quality and security of rainfall (most 
severely where colonists or plantations had reduced the supply 
available). This trend was probably not very significant in 
most areas at the time but laid the foundations for much mote 
generalised and severe problems over the last 20 years.
1960-79: Development by Modernisation
Development - or at least growth and expansion of both 
production and basic services - speeded up in the region as a 
whole and in most sub-Saharan economies over the two decades 
after independence. The dominant basic pattern was arguably a 
more intensive colonial mise en valeur emphasis on 
modernisation and expansion of selected output sub-sectors and 
related infrastructure, paralleled by more intensive and 
extensive human resource investment oriented education, and 
rather more attention to health and water supply. However at 
least one sectoral addition - import substitution industry, 
one sub-sectoral shift - toward high capital intensity 
irrigated and mechanised agriculture and one perspective shift
- to see an African state as a self contained unit for policy 
purposes (not an appendage of a broader unit centred abroad) 
were increasingly evident over time.
Output per capita and service provision coverage did rise (see 
World Bank 1981). The advance was uneven - the least favoured 
countries in natural resource or location terms and those with 
chronic policy failures did not share significantly in it - 
slow and unstable, but real. Ironically on average the best 
four years were 1976-79, the recovery following the 1973-75 
shocks and preceeding the 1980-85 debacle (see sources in fn. 
2) .
Poverty defined as low income household ability to meet basic 
consumption needs was neither rapidly nor consistently 
reduced. The basic cause was a failure of wages and 
reasonably productive self employment to rise much - if at all
- more rapidly than population plus a failure of productivity 
increases to become accessible to the poorest quarter to half 
of peasant households. Basic service accessibility did rise, 
albeit often so slowly that absolute numbers without access 
rose, even though a growing share of the people was served.
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While mass starvation was - with very rare exceptions 
averted, it is doubtful that seasonal, cyclical and endemic 
hunger were reduced markedly. From about 1965 on food, and 
from 1970 overall, agricultural production growth lagged 
behind that of population - a source of subsequent 
immiseration on three counts: increasing inability to meet
domestic food requirements from domestic production; falling 
per household cash income from sale of food or other crops; 
and falling export earnings and therefore ability to sustain 
overall capacity utilisation and maintenance or growth in the 
early and middle 1970s and more especially since 1979.
The reasons for agricultural malaise are complex, are not 
clearly understood (especially in terms of weight and 
interaction) and until the 1980s had very distinct divergences 
from country to country. In respect to poor farmers three 
stand out: concentration of resources in ways which left the 
small, isolated farmer with a low initial income unable to 
raise output; increasing population/land ratios and static 
proven knowledge (and access to inputs), leading to smaller 
holdings, more intensive land use unsustainable under existing 
systems, pushing on to poorer and/or higher weather-risk land. 
As these households usually produce primarily domestic food 
crops (with sales for cash a deduction from what are often 
already at least marginally inadequate self provisioning) and 
effective domestic food prices after 1960 did not in general 
show a cyclical fall relative to wages, there is some doubt 
how significant peasant/worker terms of trade shifts and state 
price policy (rarely effective for domestic food crops) were 
directly, except for the minority who produced export crops 
which clearly did suffer from world and domestic terms of 
trade shifts and increases in (public and also private) 
marketing costs relative to export prices.
While still representing only a small proportion of total 
absolutely poor households, urban poverty (in low productivity 
informal sector self or wage employment) began to grow very 
rapidly. Whether the urban absolutely poor households were 
much less poor than the poorest half of peasant households in 
physical consuming power terms7/ is unclear and probably
varied sharply among countries. What they did have was
somewhat better access to basic services and a far higher
chance of winning their way out of absolute poverty than most 
of the poorer half of peasant households.
In the 1970s concern about low growth of employment and of 
rural household incomes led to a substantial employment, 
technology, urban renewal and rural development studies 
industry and some pilot projects,8/ most destined to fall 
victim to post 1979 increases in resource stringency. 
Likewise concern over low food production growth led to 
increased real resource (including infrastructural investment 
and marketing working capital), institutional and policy 
attention to this sub-sector, often with attention diverted 
away from poor households and in most cases with no very
evident net positive impact on production.9/ Finally, the 
late 1960s/early 1970s falling off of growth and the negative
1974-75 growth during the first external shock crises led 
(during the 1976-79 high growth period) to a set of studies 
which formed the basis of the new conventional wisdom on 
stabilisation and structural adjustment, appearing as they did 
after the 1960-79 development dynamic had gone into reverse in 
almost all of sub-Saharan Africa.
1979 - 19??: The Resurgence of Poverty
Since 1979 the general performance of the region's economies 
has been disastrous. The combination of negative per capita 
physical output growth, falling external terms of trade and 
declining net external resource inflows (absolutely as well as 
per capita) have reduced real per capita command over 
resources to below 1970 levels for sub-Saharan Africa as a 
whole.10/ The World Bank's optimistic projections suggest no 
regional real output per capita recovery over 1985-95 and 
possibly some further deterioration on net per capita inflows 
and terms of trade (World Bank 1984).
On what has caused this massive shift of direction there is 
substantial agreement that external shocks (including 
weather), narrow margins for riding them out and the 
cumulative impact of over a decade and a half of agricultural 
failure were major factors. There is also agreement that
government policies were not optimal (not that they had been
over 1960-79 either) and were adjusted to contextual disasters 
too slowly and that for some polities civil war/state 
disintegration and/or external aggression, which - e.g. - cost 
the nine SADCC states about $10,000 mn over 1980/84 or well
over total external resource inflows for the period (SADCC
1985) , were also decisive causes. The specific weights of 
particular causes (and especially their interaction and their 
applicability to specific countries) are not agreed (see 
Allison and Green, 1985 and sources at fn. 2) nor are the
directions in which policies erred (as opposed to fairly 
pervasive overambition in scope and underperformance in 
practice).
Economic Contraction - Human Misery
The impact of economic contraction on poor people has not been 
analysed consistently, comprehensively or coherently. For 
this there are at least four reasons:
1. social and human condition indicators are not as widely, 
uniformly, regularly or carefully estimated as more 
narrowly economic ones so that data is usually
fragmentary, of doubtful inter temporal or intra country 
comparability and even less accurate than that in 
macroeconomic estimates;
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2 . structural changes - e.g. the apparent rise in the
proportion of secondary and informal incomes, especially
among the urban poor 11/ - have not been mapped
empirically, rendering many indicators either dated or
based on implausible assumptions;
3 . there is a lag between economic contraction and clear 
downturns in some indicators - especially those (e.g. 
education, health) where quality may fall drastically 
while quantity is still rising - and a further lag until 
data are collected, published and analysed (e.g. infant 
mortality estimates based on intercensual comparisons 
tend to be up to a decade behind current reality and to 
mask shifts in trend between censuses);
4. overriding macroeconomic and human survival 
(anti-starvation) - and in some cases state survival - 
concerns have pushed analysis of, as well as action on, 
human condition indicators into the background. Indeed 
when it is felt that nothing can be done to halt their 
decline (or that economic recovery is both necessary and 
sufficient for reversing that decline) there is a 
distinct desire 'not to know'.
Thus in 1984 UNICEF's Impact Of World Recession On Children 
was able to produce a broad array of suggestive and scattered 
empirical data but not a set of statistics comparable to those 
in the World Bank's annual World Development Reports. This 
was especially true for sub-Saharan Africa (see Singer and 
Green, 1984). The annual Statistics On Children In UNICEF 
Assisted Countries (UNICEF 1985) illustrates the fragmentary 
nature of relevant data (and the three-year time lag for 
attaining even some global coverage).
III. The Topography of Poverty And Hunger
But a number of main topographical elements of the development 
of poverty can be drawn. Food production per capita is still 
declining secularly - and in the early 1980s was severely 
cyclically affected by a drought belt extending from the Cape 
Verdes through the Sahel to the Sudan and down through the 
Horn and East Africa to the Cape and back to the Atlantic 
coasts of Namibia and Angola. The officially estimated ratio 
of average calorie availability relative to basic requirements
fell to 80 per cent in many cases and under 70 per cent in
some - a chilling figure when one realises that it means that 
at least half the human beings in these countries have still 
less food than that. 12/ What micro data exist suggest that
the farmers hardest hit fall into several sub-groups:
a. victims of sustained drought and/or ecological
degradation whose previous sources of income (including 
herds, seed stock, land improvements) have been wiped
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out;
b. the - usually poor, often female headed - households
pushed by land hunger onto more marginal (in terms of
soil, weather, ecological fragility) land - i.e. the 
pioneers of the 'rural sponge' effect which has to date 
limited the rise of open unemployment;
c. households in isolated or peripheral (to main urban
centres) areas who tend to be physically and
institutionally (including for private enterprise) at the 
end of the line for all goods and services and to suffer 
first and most severely from decreased flow levels;
d. small producers - usually primarily engaged in self
provisioning but also selling food, even if in
nutritional terms they have a deficit,13/ because it is
their basic source of cash income - who are unable to
increase or even sustain output in the face of static 
applicable knowledge and declining access to inputs.
Effective food prices have risen relative to wages and usually 
to prices, but for the groups cited this does litle or no good
because of stagnant or falling output. Non-food crop prices
have tended to fall in real terms - often dramatically - 
partly relating to terms of trade internationally, partly to 
currency overvaluation and partly to rising marketing costs. 
This has probably affected poor peasants less severely for two 
reasons: many non-food crop producers are not among the
poorest peasant households; and switches from non-food to food 
crops by poor peasant households have been particularly marked 
(at least in some areas). However, there are poor peasant 
households presently or formerly primarily dependent on 
non-food crops for cash income who have been severely affected 
including (e.g. in Northern and Upper Ghana) by having to sell 
more of their already inadequate food production.
Formal recorded wage employment in the region as a whole has 
been nearly static since 1979. Meanwhile real wages have 
fallen sharply - often to the point at which second and third 
incomes are essential to household survival. As open 
unemployment is not common - only those who are not absolutely 
poor or can depend on relatives can afford to be unemployed - 
this implies a rapid growth in informal sector self and 
non-recorded wage employment. Here too there was clearly a 
'sponge effect' in the 1970s, but one which appears to be 
running into productivity and market limits in the 1980s, at 
least for most young, uneducated and female informal sector 
members.
Public service provision has fallen. The basic reasons are 
budgetary stringency (with falls in real expenditure levels on 
health, education and water common and draconic ones not 
uncommon) and foreign exchange shortages (leading to missing 
drugs, pump spares, textbooks, transport, etc). In some cases
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quantity of services has fallen markedly - e.g. rural health 
in Zambia and Ghana. In more, quality has declined, e.g.
generalised shortages of school and medical service materials 
and maintenance. Supply and/or useability of nominally 
available services is severely constrained (e.g. on average 25 
per cent of rural water supply units in Tanzania are out of 
service at any one time because of missing spares or fuel) .
The decline in services has pressed particularly hard on end 
of the line areas - isolated rural districts and urban slums - 
and on those with rapidly growing populations, again 
especially urban slums but also some resettlement schemes. Or, 
more accurately, it has pressed particularly heavily on the 
poor people living in them. The rise of private primary 
schools and clinics in poor urban areas does indeed indicate 
that poor Africans value these services, but also that the 
state-supplied ones are less and less available and/or more 
and more unsatisfactory.
Raising or reintroducing fees for basic services has had a 
negative effect on access of the poor to health and education, 
but how much is unclear. This is true because there is no 
uniform pattern of fee levels (in some cases they are probably 
progressive relative to income but not in others), waiver 
possibilities and collection levels and because their supposed 
use to restore or sustain service levels is not to date very 
evident.
The most recent life expectancy and mortality data suggest 
that the health service cuts may - in several cases - have 
halted or reversed the slow improvement of life expectancy and 
decline of infant mortality trends which characterised 
sub-Saharan Africa over 1960-79. More dramatically, diseases 
nearly eradicated in the late 1950s and 1960s (e.g. yaws and 
yellow fever in Ghana) have erupted at epidemic levels and 
remained endemic because lack of funds and transport have 
limited counter campaigns. Moderate and severe child 
malnutrition has reached levels of 30 per cent or above in 
most countries for which data exist and is approaching 50 per
cent in some, even excluding famine crisis years (UNICEF 1985
and selected UNICEF country situation reports).
Meanwhile traditional security systems have been eroded - 
probably a trend well established in the 1960-79 period but 
much more nakedly evident since. Kinship and locality or
origin groups are less able to support poor members/relatives 
- especially in urban areas and rural areas affected by 
natural or other disasters. This is not simply a result of 
shifts toward less extended families and urban residence, 
relevant as these are. With economic contraction, fewer and 
fewer group members have resources (especially of cash or 
food) to spare — all boats are sinking lower. Similarly
higher cost, less available transport reduces urban/rural kin 
and migrant contacts. Reciprocal exchange - food for 
manufactures - has probably risen, but this is not an avenue
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accessible to the very poor. To exchange one must have 
something above day to day subsistence (including the cost of 
a trip) to start.
Shifting Patterns
The pattern and balance of absolute poverty have continued to 
shift. The worst declines - excluding drought/war related 
famines - appear to have been among urban poor (including for 
the first time a high proportion of recorded wage employees). 
In consuming power terms they are now clearly worse off than 
the majority of peasants and their former advantages in 
respect to access to basic services and to chances of 
advancing to higher real incomes are increasingly exiguous. 
Rural absolute poverty has grown unevenly, with the general 
rule of thumb being that households in peripheral areas - 
geographically, politically, in absolute agricultural 
potential or in perceived!4/ commercialised production - have 
fared worse on production and service access quite apart from 
being particularly prone to drought and civil government 
collapse and war debacles.
It is still true that the majority of sub-Saharan Africa's 
poorest of the poor are in refugee camps and peripheral rural 
areas, but there is now a rapidly growing urban household 
category which is almost equally immiserised. In most of the 
region's economies the net resource flow - at existing prices 
- is urban to rural, as much in states with an urban bias as 
in the minority with a rural policy bias. Oddly the clearest 
exceptions are two Stabilisation/Structural Adjustment cases, 
Ghana and Uganda, which are almost alone in having very high 
export crop taxes. In respect to non-food crops it can be 
claimed that price distortions hide a true rural to urban 
flow, but with both the trend and the post 1979 realignment of 
food crop prices in favour of producers over wage earners it 
is hard to argue the same for that sub-sector. This does not, 
however, mean equal access to basic services for rural areas, 
because state revenues from rural households and producers are 
much lower than from mineral and urban so that expenditure 
proportional to revenue results in substantially higher per 
capita spending and service provision in urban areas (and for 
both rural and urban elites).
Table 1 sets out the present levels of several Human Condition 
or Quality of Life indicators for Low Income Sub-Saharan 
Africa as of 1982 and their evolution in Ghana over 1960-84. 
The absolute levels are appalling enough but their evolution 
in Ghana is even more dispiriting. Moderately rapid real 
gains in the 1960s slowed down in the 1970s and have now gone 
into reverse. Two immediate basic causal inadequacies stand 
out - food production and the budgetary base for health and 
education. While Ghana's period of economic unsuccess dates 
to the early 1960s, not 1979, the record of change on the 
Human Condition front does not appear atypical. What was hard
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won over two decades has been undermined, eroded and 
threatened with being totally swept away in seven years. The 
stifling scent of despair is there - not universally, not
unconditionally but widely and increasingly.
IV. Stabilisation. Structural Adjustment and Poverty
Neither stabilisation nor structural adjustment is an economic 
approach usually asserted to attack poverty directly. On the 
other hand proponents argue each is an essential step to 
create the conditions within which poverty reduction is 
attainable and - less uniformly - that by reducing economic 
distortions and scarcities taken together they will 
automatically alter income distribution in favour of poor 
people. Experience to date neither contradicts nor supports 
the first contention but raises severe questions as to the 
second. Logic does - at least for sub-Saharan Africa -
support the first but in no general sense the second 
proposition.
Conceptually - and indeed in practice - stabilisation and
structural adjustment are not the same thing. Stabilisation 
necessarily comprises restoration of internal and external 
economic balance but may or may not include changes in the 
structure of production or distribution and may or may not
imply future growth (or, indeed, steady contraction as in the
1975-79 Rhodesian stabilisation policy). Indeed one criticism 
of many IMF stabilisation programmes (not only in SSA) has 
been that they achieved 'stabilisation without adjustment' 
through cutting resource use to regain balance but leaving 
economic structures unchanged so that attempts to restore 
output and restart growth more or less automatically 
'restored' imbalance.
Structural adjustment relates to basic alterations in the 
patterns of production and resource allocation. In practice 
it is seen as being linked to restoring or sustaining economic 
growth. There is no reason why structural adjustment should 
be undertaken only after severe economic imbalance has built 
up - sensible policy would be to adjust structurally to avert 
such imbalance.
Nigeria's present austerity programme with its massive cuts in 
imports, real state spending, domestic production and real 
wages to restore external account balance, limit government 
borrowing and restore external debt service, appears to be a 
genuine policy of adjustment without any clear structural 
adjustment strategy to allow renewed development once balance 
is restored. Similarly Botswana's new five year plan 
represents an attempt to set in process a programme or trend 
toward structural adjustment before the relative stagnation of 
present leading production and export sectors leads to serious 
economic imbalance.
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However, in SSA today stabilisation/structural adjustment are 
usually seen as the two halves of a single package, or two 
steps in a continuous process. This is true for two basic 
reasons: first, in a majority of SSA economies very severe
imbalances do exist and stabilisation is necessary; second, 
World Bank/bilateral structural adjustment programme support 
(and/or design) has been conditioned on prior agreement of a 
stabilisation programme with the IMF.
Setting aside some serious technical questions about the 
design of short term IMF stabilisation programmes in the 
context of longer term structural imbalances requiring 
physical structural adjustment (Green 1985d),
stabilisation/structural adjustment as preached to and in 
sub-Saharan Africa has three main features:
a. enhancement of production, exports and productivity;
b. reduction of government financing requirements (recurrent 
deficit plus investment financing) relative to Gross 
Domestic Product;
c. liberalisation in the specific sense of reduction of 
public sector directly productive and commercial activity 
and redirecting market intervention in favour of 
'efficient' enterprises and sectors.15/
Enhancement of production - especially food and basic consumer 
manufactured goods production - is necessary if absolute 
poverty in sub-Saharan Africa is to be reduced rapidly. Quite 
apart from social, political, ecological and incentive limits 
to redistribution, even present levels of per capita output, 
however distributed - much less a continued trend decline - 
would not allow all sub-Saharan Africans to escape from 
absolute poverty. Increasing exports - which have fallen 
secularly relative to GDP - is essential both to operate and 
to maintain existing productive capacity and to finance 
structural adjustment of production patterns as well as (via 
general increases in consumption and incomes) to restore real 
government revenue to allow basic service restoration. 
Raising productivity is critical to enhancement of real 
incomes (and/or to avoiding state subsidies which indirectly 
comes to the same thing at macro - though not necessarily at 
micro - economic level) - not least for poor peasant farmers 
and non-agricultural informal sector workers.
Production/Distribution - Interaction vs Separation
But structural adjustment as preached and - slightly less 
uniformly - as practised either abstracts from issues of 
distribution or views present above average
production/productivity as evidence of high potential for 
enhanced production, justifying preferential resource 
allocations (including by relative price shifts). These two
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features do create a bias against the poor - and one not 
necessarily consistent with economic efficiency narrowly 
defined.
Distribution patterns - spatially, sectorally, by social group 
and by sub-class - are primarily determined by who produces 
what, where, by what technology, under what production 
relations. This is not a new nor a radical economic 
proposition. It is as central to the analysis of Adam Smith 
and David Ricardo as to that of Karl Marx. It is particularly 
true in poor economies such as those of sub-Saharan Africa in 
which post initial distribution fiscal redistribution in the 
form of state social security or other consumer transfer 
payment is - necessarily - very much smaller both absolutely 
and relative to GDP than in middle or high income economies. 
If most of the poor people of sub-Saharan Africa are to become 
less poor they need to be enabled to produce more - i.e. in 
peasant agricultural and informal (small scale) 
non-agricultural activity. In general there is no evidence
that such a concentration of resources would reduce growth 
rates at micro or sectoral levels - on balance au contraire 
16/ - and it would almost certainly reduce the incremental
import/output rates which should allow greater growth at 
macroeconomic level.
If potential for increased production - particularly in 
respect to peasant agriculture - is identified on the basis of 
above average present individual or area performance, then a 
clear bias against the poor is introduced. It is also one not 
necessarily consistent with economic logic - incremental 
resources should yield higher returns when added to initially 
particularly resource deprived units and/or complementing 
existing inputs (e.g. labour) unless the point is that to
allocate broadly will result in such small incremental
resource flows to any one unit as to be below the minimum
critical size for any output gain at all.
Public Accounts Balancing; By What Means?
Reducing government borrowing requirements is not a goal in 
itself. It is a means to bringing resource demand and supply 
into balance. Imbalance - at least extreme imbalance as 
existing in many sub-Saharan Africa economies whether defined 
in terms of inflation, absolute poverty or capacity 
underutilisation - does create distortions which tend to weigh 
particularly heavily on poor, politically weak and vulnerable 
groups (or sub-classes). Reducing government borrowing 
requirements can be achieved by increasing revenue and/or 
cutting expenditure not beneficial to the poor (e.g. some 
aspects of administration and security servicesl?/ or 
subsidies oriented to upper or middle income groups).
However, in practice most structural adjustment programmes - 
whether nationally designed or based on IMF and World Bank
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advice - have tended to concentrate on reducing borrowing by 
cutting real government and public enterprise recurrent and 
capital expenditure. Within that frame expenditure cuts have 
not necessarily been biased against basic services sectors!8/ 
but have not in general been designed to protect them. And 
within those sectors the mechanics of cutting have left 
capital intensive units with disproportionate levels of staff 
and limited access, so that those services most critical to 
the poor have suffered disproportionately.19/
This bias is increased by cost recovery approaches 
concentrating on basic services. It is not clear that user 
charges to deter overprovision are needed in sub-Saharan 
Africa - nobody really contends that either quality or 
quantity of basic services is adequate. Nor on standard 
Treasury grounds of certainty, ease of collectability and 
cost/revenue ratio are primary school fees, charges for 
anti-diarrhoeal salts and vaccinations nor standpipe water 
superior to either general or amenity consumer goods sales tax 
increases - quite the reverse in most cases. Nor, given the 
rather tenuous observable connection between imposition of 
such charges and improvement of services, are they likely to 
be a very acceptable form of tax unless locally controlled and 
earmarked as to use - an approach which may have some 
potential but has not figured prominently in stabilisation or 
structural adjustment programmes.
If such charges are at low levels and can be waived at point 
of service provision for those too poor to pay, they may not 
be a major factor in restricting access. The Christian 
medical services in Ghana and state primary schools in 
Tanzania do appear to have achieved that type of fee pattern 
(at the price of very erratic and unpredictable collection in 
the Tanzanian case) but it is by no means clear that access 
constricting effects are in general equally limited.
Charges on services going largely to higher income groups or 
which carry direct and rapid economic benefits to recipients 
may need examination with a view to increased charges if 
collection procedures and costs are manageable. Examples 
include above average room and board in hospitals; specialised 
high cost medical services; household piped water connections; 
passenger car licences; drivers licences; university and other 
tertiary education.
In some of these cases - e.g. water - higher charges for above 
average income users are practicable and can be used to 
cross-subsidise low income - e.g. standpipe or communal tap - 
users. However, in others - e.g. higher education - higher 
fees and lower bursaries are not necessarily a preferable 
solution to restraining salary levels or increasing the 
progressivity of income taxes.
This bias against providing physically and economically 
accessible basic services to poor people, like that in
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distribution of production - is open to challenge on 
production as well as human grounds. The sick, the illiterate 
and those tired from long hours collecting water are not able 
to work long, hard and productively. Those physically or 
mentally handicapped in infancy, childhood or youth by lack of 
medical care and/or malnutrition, as well as those unable to 
develop their productive skills through lack of access to 
education, are a drag on future productive potential.
Liberalisation in stabilisation and adjustment does not mean 
laissez faire for three reasons. First, nobody really 
believes that sub-Saharan Africa economies could move to, for 
example, free floating exchange rates and no import licensing 
at one go, nor that there is no role for public enterprises to 
play. Second, selective and phased reduction of 'distortions' 
requires monitoring to prevent the net result being greater 
distortion, not less. The debate is over which distortions, 
what monitoring, which controls. Third, stabilisation and 
structural adjustment policies are selectively interventionist 
quite as much as the policies their architects criticise. 
Deliberate holding down of nominal wages (reducing real wages) 
while raising agricultural prices and interest rates does not 
constitute neutrality nor is it even an approximation of 
allowing unregulated market price determination. Nor does 
advice to raise salaries sharply and minimum wages marginally 
constitute reliance on the market. Market forces might or 
might not20/ produce similar results, the point is that what 
structural adjustment is doing is to intervene directly not to 
allow market determination, presumably on the same assumption 
of market imperfections as previous policies - though with 
different goals.
Reduction in the scope of public sector enterprises is argued 
on mixed grounds of over-extension leading to generalised 
inefficiency justifying cutbacks whether the private sector 
steps in or not, specific greater private sector efficiency in 
particular cases and general assertions of public enterprises' 
'inherent' low economic efficiency.
Liberalisation For Whom?
Liberalisation - in the sense of reducing bureaucratic 
regulation and market intervention in favour of or against 
specific sectors, sub-classes, groups, enterprises or
individuals - is not necessarily against the interests of the 
poor. African government departments and public enterprises 
clearly are spread too thin; selective cutbacks on 
non-essentials could increase the efficiency of basic service 
and commercial service/basic goods production. Preferential 
resource allocations often favour the rich, the powerful and
those close to decision takers (by location, kinship or
sub-class). Regulations are harder for the poor to comprehend 
and follow (or to bribe their way around) and distortions 
harder for them to exploit than for the non-poor. Many
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interventions are now - whatever their intent or pre-1980 
impact - clearly ineffective, cross cancelling or 
counterproductive.
But the specific liberalisations proposed do tend to be biased 
against the poor as, more generally, are markets under the 
conditions of rigidity and structural imbalance which 
characterise sub-Saharan Africa. Compressing real wages, 
cutting government services, concentrating public (or 
successor private) enterprise activity on the most profitable 
bits of business ('picking the eyes out of it' in, e.g. 
transport or crop purchasing) are most certainly not neutral 
between poor peasants and workers and less poor farmers and 
businessmen. There is no equally general case that they are 
efficient in production enhancing terms.
V .______Toward Broadening The Formulation Of Structural
Adjustment?
At this level the argument would appear to imply that 
Structural Adjustment - even resting on its present tripod of 
production, state borrowing reduction and selective 
liberalisation (or redirection of intervention) could have 
positive implications for poor sub-Saharan Africans and that 
the first (production) leg is a necessary condition for such 
gains. However, it would appear equally true that most 
current programmes have unnecessary built-in biases against 
the poor. Since these costs come early in the adjustment 
process and the gains from enhanced production later, the 
temporal pattern is to require the poor to accept high, 
certain initial costs for lagged, uncertain gains - a pattern 
inconsistent with their margins above survival or their life 
expectancy.21/
There is another - complementary - way of approaching the 
interaction between stabilisation linked to structural 
adjustment and poverty. This is to query whether or not the 
success of current structural adjustment programmes on their 
own terms is likely to be a sufficient condition for reversing 
the deterioration of human condition indicators - and, much 
more important, the human conditions - in sub-Saharan Africa.
On the face of it the answer is negative unless - as is most 
unusual - the structural adjustment programme both posits and 
achieves a sustained output growth rate of over 6 per cent and 
a full recovery of real government basic service spending (or 
a targeted, articulated shift toward lower unit cost basic 
health, education and water and away from higher cost, limited 
access services) an approach endorsed by the World Bank (1984) 
but not yet actually built into any existing programme.22/
The reasoning behind this conclusion is relatively 
straightforward:
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a. growth rates of 4 to 5 per cent before 1979 yielded 
limited reductions in absolute poverty and slow advances 
in access to basic services;
b. structural adjustment requires raising savings and
reducing external deficits, implying a lower growth of 
overall domestic resource use and especially of domestic 
consumption than of GDP;
c. most actual structural adjustment programmes - even if
not the logic of structural adjustment - are biased 
against basic services and production by poor people.
This case is accentuated by the fact that almost all 
programmes have received less external finance than external 
analysts - notably the World Bank - have thought prudent and 
have also been buffeted by unanticipated external terms of 
trade and weather shocks.
What is usually - and quite reasonably - viewed as the model 
African structural adjustment programme, that of Ghana 
adopted by the Ghanaian government in early 1983 and
articulated with substantial Bank and Fund input over the
subsequent year - appears to illustrate the point:
a. output growth has been positive in 1983, 1984 and 1985 - 
the first three-year run of GDP growth in over 20 years 
with 1984 and 1985 growth probably in the 5 to 6.5 per 
cent range;
b. very substantial liberalisation has taken place (notably 
in respect to exchange rates and prices);
c. the government borrowing requirement has been reduced to 
one third the average for sub-Saharan Africa relative to- 
GDP (albeit by reducing real government spending and the 
ratio of revenue to GDP so that both were in 1984/85 
among the lowest in the world);
d. holding the external financing position in rough balance 
(and reducing arrears) despite lower than targeted 
foreign resource inflows and lagged export recovery 
partly due to weather;
e. reducing inflation from the order of 120 per cent in 1983 
to perhaps 13 per cent in 1985 (admittedly partly because 
good 1984 and 1985 national harvests followed 1983's very 
severely drought curtailed crops) and thus achieving 
positive real interest rates.
It is difficult to envisage a much more successful structural 
adjustment programme than Ghana's in terms of its own macro 
production and balance objectives. But the poverty trend 
appears to remain in the wrong direction. Real cuts in health
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and education have virtually halved per capita public health 
service provision since 1981. Minimum wage levels can 
purchase perhaps a seventh of a plausible household 
consumption basket and - after late 1985 increases - remain 
below 1982 real levels. Real food (but to date not real 
non-food) grower prices are above 1982 levels, but in the 
poorest regions even 1985 output remains below 1982's already 
depressed levels, casting grave doubts on whether most small 
peasant producers have benefitted. The situation of the 
growing proportion of urban households in absolute poverty is 
better than at the peak of the drought/food crisis of 1983/84 
but only because of food output recovery and food price falls 
which are as exogenous to the structural adjustment programme 
as the 1983/84 food prices and availability deterioration. 
Inputs and supporting services (e.g. research, extension)
relevant to poor farmers' ability to increase production are 
not being given priority - indeed no coherent framework exists 
for enabling such peasants to produce more. Reversal of the
fall in real health and educational service provision - and
some reversal of draconic declines in public service real 
wages to halt the loss of key personnel and the
moonlighting/unofficial use of public resources - has now
become a goal, but the initial revenue increasing proposals
seem to centre on user fees which are, on the face of it,
likely to limit access, and are unlikely to be as
revenue/collection cost efficient as more general tax 
measures.
Limitations of Success
In short, the Ghana Structural Adjustment Programme is a 
notable success in its own terms. If sustained, its reversal 
of the declining per capita output trend is both a major 
achievement and a precondition for sustainable poverty 
reduction/basic service provision. But partly because of the 
formulation of some elements in the programme, and even more 
because of what it does not include, its effect on basic
service provision has to date been negative and on absolute 
poverty uneven but probably negative both for peasant 
households, the poorest rural areas and for urban slum
households. This is clearly an unsatisfactory result in human
terifts but also in respect to human productive capacity and 
socio-political sustainability of the programme's successful 
output recovery side. The question is what can be done - in 
Ghana and more generally in sub-Saharan Africa - to face 
poverty issues more directly with the probability of positive 
short to medium term results within real resource constraints.
It should be made clear that by 1983 Ghana clearly did need to 
undertake drastic stabilisation and structural adjustment 
measures. A buildup of imbalances over 1961-65 had - despite, 
or because of, frequent changes of regime and of verbal policy 
never been tackled seriously either in terms of 
stabilisation or of structural adjustment. The underlying
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strength, viability and growth potential of the economy had 
been declining for over two decades with severe social and 
political repercussions. Apparent partial recoveries owed 
more to brief cocoa booms than to underlying performance, let 
alone purposive policy measures. The 1983 change of course 
(or seeking to set one as opposed to drifting) was both 
necessary and courageous and did try to tackle certain key 
weaknesses. What is at. issue is not that, but whether a more 
inclusive articulation of stabilisation and adjustment, with 
greater attention to income generation by poor people and to 
maintaining basic health services and nutritional levels, 
would have been practicable and desirable.
This question is increasingly asked by Ghanaians and within 
the World Bank, with a view to redefining structural
adjustment so as to make it more inclusive and more effective. 
From that perspective it is not useful to argue whether human 
condition indicator decline over 1983-85 was caused by the 
structural adjustment programme as executed or not. Evidently 
the decline began before 1983 and would not have been halted 
by continuation of the 1966-81 policy of resolute
irresolution. Equally evidently, the budgetary measures 
adopted have severely damaged the health service. The basic 
propositions are that the present trends are humanly,
politically and economically unacceptable, and that halting 
and reversing them should be specific priorities within the 
structural adjustment programme.
VI. Within African Reach?
Twenty five years in sub-Saharan Africa, much of it grappling 
with poverty issues, should lead neither to a belief that 
there are simple answers, nor that answers appropriate to one 
country at one time are easily generalisable or sustainable. 
The dilemmas of analysts engaged in the struggle against 
poverty in the region are reminiscent of T. S. Eliot's lament 
on getting the better of words only for the things he was no 
longer disposed to say or the way he no longer wished to say 
them, and of the recurrent attempts to recapture what had been 
known and lost and rediscovered - of starting again at a time 
which seemed unpropitious after 20 years largely wasted.
The need for emergency action is agreed in principle and in 
practice as - at a more speculative level - is that for basic 
service restoration, making possible increased production by 
poor peasants and, perhaps, enhancing opportunities for 
informal sector employment and productivity advances. 
However, the longer term goals are often seen as after the 
crisis and after structural adjustment; the emergency actions 
tend to be episodic and case by case; the two phases are not 
articulated and programmed as a sequential whole and both sets 
of exercises are treated as parallel to production and balance 
focused macro and sectoral structural adjustment. That is 
simply not good enough, intellectually or operationally.
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Emergency action is essential because people are dying, but 
also because damage to ecological, production and basic 
service delivery systems, once sustained, is very hard to 
reverse and, until reversed, will continue to cost lives. The 
most obvious emergency support measures are food aid and 
interim basic medical care. The first is illustrated (as are 
its limitations) by the responses to the stark visions of 
starvation in Africa screened in 1984-85. The second is best 
exemplified by UNICEF's evolving 'Child Survival Revolution' 
programme including immunisation, anti-diarrhoeal salts (oral 
rehydration) nutritional monitoring and education, evolving in 
certain cases into more integrated but still focused primary 
health care support (isolated rural and/or urban slum posts 
and clinics).
These programmes are essential. UNICEF's African poster with 
the question and answer bracketing the face of a young girl - 
'What do you want to be when you grow up?' 'Alive' - sets the 
initial challenge starkly but realistically.
Survival: What Next?
However, emergency action in sub-Saharan Africa will both need 
to be continued (not necessarily in the same areas) for a 
decade or more and to be seen as an initial phase of a broader 
struggle to reduce vulnerability and poverty by creating 
survival security structures based in Africa and involving 
poor Africans as producers and subjects, not receivers and 
objects. This perspective has several implications for 
emergency programmes:
a. the question - after survival, what next? - should be 
posed from the start because of its implications for 
emergency programming. For example food aid so delivered 
as to allow peasants to remain in their homes, maintain 
their social units and prepare for the return of the 
rains is much more conducive to making survival the first 
step to self rehabilitation than food aid in mass camps 
of dislocated, totally dependent refugees;
b. similarly the same question implies that - e.g. - rural 
emergency food provision needs to be linked with the 
inputs (seed, tools, transport home, etc.) needed for an 
economically wiped out household to begin to produce 
again;
c. in parallel, attempts to meet emergency health needs 
should go beyond specific injections - e.g. 
immunisation/vaccination campaigns and oral rehydration - 
to selective support for keeping a basic health service 
functioning, as illustrated by the UNICEF/Danida basic 
rural drug provision programme in Tanzania and the UNICEF 
inputs into selected primary health care posts in Ghana;
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d. emergency inputs should be utilised to increase
productive and basic service capacity and enhance the 
self respect and dignity of participants, e.g. Zimbabwe's 
rural public works scheme including agricultural 
infrastructure focused food for work projects;
e. recipients should be involved as participants in 
programme operation and - to the extent practicable - 
coverage and design.
None of these steps is impossible. The usual argument that in 
an emergency there is no time to take them implies that
emergencies are few and far between, unforeseen and not 
susceptible to identifying overall guidelines for broader 
approaches (as well as for food distribution or vaccination
campaigns) .
That is nonsense. Emergency efforts have been needed
frequently and repeatedly in sub-Saharan Africa for over a 
decade. They will continue to be needed. The points outlined 
above are fairly commonly relevant to articulating programmes. 
African governments, international agencies, bilateral aid 
bodies and voluntary organisations can and should plan ahead 
both as to basic capacity to finance or collect more resources 
and as to basic programme designs and checklists. Combined 
with better early warning systems on food supply and health 
hazards - and less unwillingness to believe and act on the 
data until people are visibly dying or on the verge of dying 
from starvation or epidemics - such an approach could both 
increase the human survival results of emergency programmes 
and make them infinitely more effective as first steps toward 
rehabilitation/self rehabilitation of recipients/participants 
who are, virtually by definition, highly vulnerable and 
absolutely poor.
Such an approach to emergency (human survival) programming has 
definite implications for longer term strategies and 
possibilities for reducing absolute poverty and absolute lack 
of access to basic services. First, if emergency assistance 
is to encompass initial rehabilitation it should be seen 
within the context of longer term employment - food production 
- basic service - poverty reduction strategies, both as an 
initial stage and also as a supporting measure to prevent 
their crippling or destruction when these strategies already 
existed before the emergency. Second, such a perspective 
suggests that the relatively watertight compartmentalisation 
of emergency assistance from development assistance is 
counter-productive for both and requires critical reassessment 
and 'structural adjustment’. Third, viewed in this way even 
emergency, human survival programmes are (or can be) relevant 
to sustaining and restoring human resources and production and 
therefore integral to, not an unwelcome diversion from, 
structural adjustment (cf Reutlinger' 1985) .
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Toward The Longer Term
The articulation of longer term strategies and their 
components is beyond the scope of this essay for reasons of 
space, contextual specificity, the author's competence and the 
need for far more African involvement from the start than has 
characterised past strategies (including those of the World 
Employment Programme, WHO and even UNICEF) which are all too 
much . prepared for Africans, rather than with their 
involvement. A somewhat more detailed sketch of some 
components can be found in UNICEF's Within Human Reach, a 
study largely prepared in Africa and with the full involvement 
of Africans. However, some areas for attention can be 
flagposted.
First, the production/productivity focus of the present World 
Bank structural adjustment approach is crucial. Production is 
important, and stripping programmes of biases against 
production by poor people neither should nor need mean 
blurring that goal.
Second, the achievement of less severe external imbalance by a 
combination of higher exports, genuine import substitution and 
more concessional resource transfers is also necessary. 
Structural adjustment and growth of output are, at least in 
sub-Saharan Africa, totally inconsistent with neo-autarchy. 
Import strangulation is a fact weighing heavily on poor people 
in at least half of the region. The true dialogue is on the 
nature of relationships to the world economy, balance of 
instruments, phasing and practicable timing.
Third, unless government fiscal and monetary imbalances - and 
continuous resultant pressures for cuts - can be reduced, the 
chances of providing basic production support (extension, 
research, infrastructure, credit) and basic services to small 
peasant and/or non-agricultural informal sub-sectors are 
negligible. Prudent fiscal and monetary management is as 
integral to 'economic adjustment with a human face' (cf. 
UNICEF 1985:64ff) as to any other variant.
Fourth, because government resources (financial, human, 
physical, foreign exchange) are limited, priorities - i.e. 
choices as to what not to do as well as what is to be done - 
are necessary. For example if primary health care is to be 
expanded to universal access in sub-Saharan Africa, then its 
share of health resources relative to limited access, high 
unit cost curative treatment must be expanded, which may 
require absolute cuts in the latter. Similarly if production 
enhancement by low income peasant farmers is a priority, then 
the research, extension, input supply and other requirements 
to make such an increase possible must be made available, even 
though this means reducing allocations to large scale, 
mechanised, import intensive farming (an alteration of balance 
likely to have a positive effect on production and external
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Up to this point what is proposed is not simply consistent 
with, but based on the same priority themes as, conventional 
structural adjustment strategy and programming. At least at 
applied level (possibly not at philosophical) the differences 
are secondary. However, as argued above, this is not enough 
if human beings - and especially poor human beings - are seen 
as the subjects and the justification of development. 
Production growth plus manageable external and public finance 
balances are virtually always necessary conditions for 
significant improvement of the incomes and lives of poor 
people; they are rarely sufficient conditions. Therefore, a 
number of additional guideposts are needed.
ba lance as well as on poverty reducti on) .
Focus On Food
Fifth, increased food availability to poor people is a central 
goal (cf. World Bank 1986). Given the external balance 
position, this means either enhanced production or balanced 
regional trade expansion in all but a handful of cases. But 
food availability to the majority of ill-nourished Africans 
who are members of poor peasant households, requires that they 
be enabled to produce more (cf. Burki 1985; World Bank 1986). 
This is economically feasible - indeed much more cost 
efficient than most large scale agricultural programmes - and 
in the present food crises context probably politically and 
intellectually feasible as well. The problem is partly 
technical - articulating contextually relevant programmes 
based on collecting reasonably accurate data and 
testing/adapting new techniques for application. It is also 
partly institutional and partly resource management - actually 
giving priority to hoes and field testing, effective extension 
and availability of seasonal inputs on time.23/ None of these 
technical and institutional problems are inherently any harder 
to solve than those of other agricultural production promotion 
strategies. Similar considerations apply to enhancing poor
peasant cash income which in most cases will come primarily
from achieving a genuine food surplus above household self 
provisioning requirements. This is not to argue against
increasing non-food crop production for industrial inputs 
(e.g. cotton) and for export. Sub-Saharan Africa's problem is 
one of low agricultural growth, not substitution of non-food 
for food crops. With rational agricultural prices peasants 
can judge what balance of crops to produce for self 
provisioning and for sale and whether to seek saleable
surpluses of food or grow non-food crops in addition to self
provisioning food production. For example, in some drought
prone areas small peasant farmers are well advised to grow
both cotton and food crops, with the former an anti-famine 
safeguard because low rainfall affects cotton far less (indeed 
in some areas an optimal cotton weather year results in
partial food crop failure and vice versa) .
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Sixth, effective food availability for poor urban (or other
non-agricultural) households turns on price/income
relationships. Attempts to hold food prices down by squeezing 
growers are counter-productive (especially if growers are 
actually squeezed, less so if they simply use parallel 
markets) because they reduce supply and either result in
higher effective prices to low income consumers or in
unmanageable import and subsidy bills. Higher rural
productivity and larger supplies are much more likely to
reduce real urban food prices. Therefore, the concentration 
must be on raising incomes through more, and more 
productive^/, employment/self employment. How to do so is the 
basic question and one needing data (on what is produced how 
and on what the actual income sources of low income
sub-Saharan African households are, as well as on technical 
and institutional production/employment/productivity
possibilities), plus a coherent approach (not treating
'appropriate technology' or 'the informal sector' as isolated, 
homogenous artifacts which they are not) linked to a 
systematic attempt to treat employment/distribution and 
production/productivity issues as joint goals and programming 
exercises, not separate or alternative ones.
The World Employment Programme and subsequent African basic 
needs mission studies do provide a foundation for devising 
contextual approaches on these lines. The main obstacles - 
once better data bases are built - would appear to be 
political (the urban poor in sub-Saharan Africa are neither 
represented in enough governing sub-class coalitions nor 
enough of a threat to their survival to receive priority 
attention in many countries) and intellectual (the depth and 
extent of urban poverty is still not fully comprehended, the 
limits of modernisation approaches are only beginning to be 
perceived, the somewhat faddy, sloppy and romantic approaches 
of some 'intermediate technology' and 'informal sector' true 
believers have created a climate of scepticism). The key 
crisis forcing rethinking is the growing realisation that with 
three to four per cent annual economically active population 
growth to the end of the century, employment growth outside 
peasant agriculture and the large scale, capital intensive 
enterprise sector is essential. Enhanced productivity and 
greater production on the one hand give the possibility of 
having effective urban consumer access to food and basic 
consumer goods, and on the other rural producer access to 
basic consumer goods and agricultural inputs. Both
non-agricultural workers and peasants need to become less poor 
and to have incentives for raising productivity (and working 
longer) to raise marketed output of goods and services.
And Basic Services
Seventh, universal 
education, water and 
extension related to
access to basic 
production support 
the two preceeding
services (health, 
such as research and 
priorities) within a
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finite time period (even if that must be up to 20 or 25 years) 
needs to be seen a priority. Poor people, especially women 
and indigenous minorities, do benefit disproportionately from 
broadening access because when access is constricted they are 
the ones excluded. Literacy, nutrition, health and reduction 
of time spent collecting water are critical to enhancing the 
ability to work harder and more productively now and over
time.25/ To articulate such priorities into costed,
sustainable programmatic form is not impossible if: a)
non-essentials are cut out (e.g. via basic drug lists) ; b) 
there is a real priority in personnel and policy allocation 
given to doing so. The obstacles are - especially for health 
and water - intellectual and political. Low cost/universal 
access services are only now building up a cadre of
professionals, a body of literature and a degree of 
respectability even remotely resembling that behind 'state of 
the art' approaches whose costs are such as to render them 
largely non-functional or practical only on a limited access 
basis in sub-Saharan Africa. Piped water to houses and high 
quality curative medicine do appeal directly to political 
decision takers and civil servants (who use and - reasonably 
enough — want to have them). The balance in the intellectual
dialogue is shifting toward low cost/universal access; the
political self interest obstacle is very real and often very 
intractable in most of sub-Saharan Africa.
Eighth, basic survival and support mechanisms are needed 
because emergencies will continue to arise. People matter, 
and the view of Nassau Senior that the Irish famine would not 
kill enough people to achieve adequate structural adjustment 
of population to land is not an acceptable political economic 
position today. Again there is a perfectly respectable 
production case - the reduction of dislocation caused by 
unforeseen and unprepared for emergencies could have a high 
payoff in reducing their immediate and subsequent negative
impact on growth. The problem is in devising approaches which 
do meet survival and preservation of self rehabilitation 
potential needs while being financially and institutionally 
feasible in specific sub-Saharan African contexts.26/ A 
crucial set relate to food (see Reutlinger 1985; World Bank
1986) . Pre-planned food for work programmes (urban as well as
rural) operating at some level continuously but capable of
being stepped up nationally or locally when required are an 
example. So, where technically and financially feasible, are 
food reserves linked to minimum buying price safety nets for 
peasant producers in bumper crop years. Such an approach 
would also avert the danger of food aid so depressing domestic 
crop prices in good years as to reverse the production revival 
- a danger which is exacerbated by the long lag between need 
and supply of food aid usually resulting in large deliveries 
in the six months after domestic supplies have become 
adequate .27/ A related approach applies to sub-marginal 
agricultural/pastoral area residents. Here production returns 
to combined input and emergency relief (including food for 
work) programmes may well be low and the potential for
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sustained productivity increases problematic. However, in 
practice there is often nowhere else the human beings in these 
areas can go. If any value is placed on their survival and 
welfare, cost efficient programmes to ensure it are needed. 
Economic growth alone cannot proceed fast enough to end 
chronic food insecurity for these people. Both because their 
lives do matter and because chronic food insecurity reduces 
their productivity yet further, specific interventions in 
their favour - including improving their production capacity, 
providing additional income generating possibilities (e.g. 
seasonal works programmes) and emergency food and production 
input distribution - are needed (cf. Reutlinger 1985).
Ninth, environmental and ecological protection should be 
rescued from its European/North American upper middle class 
origins and related to the struggle against poverty and for 
sustainable production. Need can be as damaging
environmentally as greed but cannot be dealt with by the same 
instruments. For example, deforestation (more accurately 
denudation by stripping all tree and bush cover) is disastrous 
in its impact on productivity and in its contribution to
desertification (loosely defined), erosion and dust bowls. It 
also increases the burdens on women and girls (and reduces 
their ability to grow crops, attend school, secure medical 
attention, improve environmental sanitation). If it is caused 
by land mining farmers - e.g. Western Sudanese mechanised 
sorghum farming - or forest ravaging loggers, then financial 
and criminal sanctions are relevant. But if - as in a
majority of the most critical sub-Saharan African cases - it 
is caused by an increasing population practising shorter 
rotations and needing to collect (for household provisioning 
or sale to urban areas) fuel and building materials, such
measures are both normatively inappropriate and certain to
fail. Imprisoning or hanging every bush cutter from 
Timbucktoo to Gao or Mwanza to Shinyanga is hardly a plausible 
answer to neo-desertification in Mali or dust bowl development 
in Tanzania. Tree planting (encouraged by extension services 
but basically carried out by rural residents and/or urban fuel 
oriented producer co-operatives) and alternative fuel 
development would appear to be the only practicable basic 
answers28/ even if both require time and patience to build up 
an adequate, self sustaining basis.
Tenth, budgetary balance should be restored primarily by 
increasing revenue, not cutting services. In sub-Saharan
Africa, revenue to GDP ratios vary but some are almost
incredibly low even for very low income countries. Universal 
access basic services cannot be provided primarily on a profit 
making basis, both because large portions of them can operate 
only at a 'loss' and because external economies are large. 
Within revenue augmentation, attention should be focused on 
selective (progressive to well above the poverty line) 
indirect taxes and on progressive direct taxes which are in 
practice at least mildly redistributive on both the revenue
and - more particularly - the expenditure side. Fees on
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limited access, high cost services (e.g. household water 
connections, above average use household electricity and water 
bills, above average health facility space and diet provision, 
specialist medical treatment) are at least as justifiable on 
this basis as luxury consumer goods taxes and are often fairly 
easy and low cost to collect. Charges for basic services are 
more problematic. Unless a quick, effective waiver system at 
contact point can be devised and operated, poor people, and 
especially their children, will be excluded. If fees can be 
seen to relate to services (e.g. a biannual borehole overhaul 
fee raised communally and paid when - and if - the overhaul 
takes place; local contribution of agricultural work or food
to allow a primary health care worker to do health work
without destroying the family nutritional base) they can help 
mobilise resources, increase community support and reduce net 
central government cost. Otherwise they will be very 
unpopular in a context of fragile and often interrupted 
services. Large numbers of small charges have high collection 
costs - not least in skilled personnel time if, for example,
nurses are expected to collect hundreds of small oral
rehydration salts or vaccination fees as part of their daily 
work.29/
Accountability, Participation And Production
Eleventh, without participation by poor people no anti-poverty 
programme will be fully successful even in material terms. 
The case for participation in production and resource 
mobilisation (e.g. self help inputs of labour, materials, even 
cash into basic service and infrastructure provision) is 
presumably self evident. What is less accepted is that poor 
people need to participate in programme design, ongoing 
management and monitoring/evaluation. The reasons are not 
romantic - poor people do have knowledge about their own needs 
and capabilities which experts do not; participation in 
production and 'takeup' of services is related to whether they 
do correspond and are responsive to users' needs and 
preferences; participation can create incentives for officials 
to be more responsive to poor people (a not inconsiderable
factor in programme success, however good or weak the initial 
design); self help resource mobilisation is practicable only 
if those who are to mobilise the resources believe their use 
is appropriate, for their benefit and at least partially under 
their control. The political and institutional obstacles to 
participation (and the real, if partial and limited, successes
in overcoming them) do not need rehearsing and are not limited
to sub-Saharan Africa. They need to be seen as conflicts to 
be contained, circumvented or overcome, not as given and
immutable barriers to action.
Participation - and accountability - pose special problems for 
external bodies including multilateral, bilateral and 
voluntary aid or development agencies. This is true even when 
they are intellectually committed to participation and to
30
accountability to intended beneficiaries. First, almost by 
definition their personnel are 'outsiders' usually with faily 
brief country experience and broad perception gaps or distance 
from host government officials and intellectuals, let alone 
African peasants, urban slum dwellers, women and children. 
Second, their structures of accountability run (usually 
hierarchically) through their own institution to its policy 
makers and those to whom it is accountable, not to host 
governments and through them to ordinary Africans, much less 
directly to the latter. In a sense these tensions are not 
fully soluble. However, facing them squarely is a necessary 
first step toward reducing tensions to manageable levels, 
improving host-agency relationships and avoiding the 
escalation of tensions into antagonistic contradictions and 
the deterioration of dialogue into accusatory rhetoric.
Twelfth, while any strategy for overcoming poverty must be 
based on the actions of poor people and poor countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa, if it is to have a real chance of 
sustainable success, external support is critical. The 
resources available domestically are too limited and the 
exogenous shocks too great for any strategy depending wholly 
on domestic resources to be more than problematic in results 
or more than excruciatingly slow in paying off (especially for 
its intended beneficiaries and participants). The need for 
real resource - including knowledge - transfers (from other 
developing countries as well as from industrial ones) is as 
great in respect to the broader as to the narrower aspects of 
structural adjustment.
One 'resource' of which less is needed is pre-emptive or 
coercive advice. Imposed programmes rarely survive the crisis 
stick or the resource carrot - even if they are inherently 
sound. Only Africans are primarily concerned about and able 
to achieve the development of Africa. The record of expert 
model solutions to African problems is - to say the least - 
not very good, partly at least because these models almost 
always lack contextual, temporal and technical knowledge 
Africans (often poor Africans) possess and their expert
designers did not.
The above comment may seem a good reason not to have written 
this essay. However two justifications exist. Dialogue and 
suggestion are not the same as pre-emptive designing or 
coercive advice. And the case for narrowly defined structural 
adjustment and setting aside the battle against poverty and 
for universal access to basic services has been so widely 
trumpeted as to be deafening - even to those Africans who
doubt its validity. There is an obligation on those who 
believe there are alternatives to make clear that Africans are 
not alone in seeing the 'new conventianal wisdom' on Africa as
partial, narrow and in part ill designed and worse
implemented.
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To scrutinise this paper for universal, timeless, general,
easy, directly applicable answers to how to overcome poverty 
in sub-Saharan Africa would be futile. Par ° 1 ^ .
that there are no such answers - except wrong ones,
political and political economic strategies, actions and 
results do have general internal requirements and
organisational principles but to become operational, (at .Least 
as envisaged), they must have objective contextual
correlatives in time and space.
The struggle against poverty - and especially against
despairing acceptance that the fight is inevitably and
irretrievably lost - in sub-Saharan Africa to ay is wage in 
an unpropitious context. But it is not an impossible context, 
r.    , and those concerned with
VII. A Valedictory Note
Even more fundamental, poor Africans and those concer 
them have only that context and its presen =
limitations and potentials from which to begin, 
experience in the struggle against poverty does not suggest 
that the New Jerusalem can be achieved nor that partial 
successes once won will be easily or permanently sustaina e. 
But nor does it suggest either that nothing can be done or 
that nothing can be done until production problems are ^rge y 
overcome. Strategies of structural adjustment combining 
production and distribution, productivity and raising poor 
households' incomes, food balance and external balance, isca 
balance and progress toward universal access to basic services 
- and their partial and gradual articulation and 
implementation - are within human reach generally and within 
African reach specifically.
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TABLE 1
SELECTED QUALITY OF LIFE INDICATORS: 
------  I960 - m i d - 1 9 8 0 s (a)
1. Average Life Expectancy 
at Birth
2. Infant Mortality Rate
3. Child Death Rate
4. Access to Health 
Facility (b)
5. Public Health Facility 
Visits Per Person
Per Year
6. Health Budget as 
% of GDP
7. Access to Pure Water (c)
Rural
Urban
Total
8. Access to Excreta 
Disposal (d)
Rural
Urban
Total
9. Average Calorie Avail­
ability as a % of 
requirements
10. Child Malnutrition 
(Moderate/Severe)
11. Primary Education 
Enrolment Ratio (e)
12. Adult Literacy
13. Education Budget as 
% of GDP
14. Proportion of Population 
Below Absolute Poverty 
Line (f)
Rural
Urban
1960
45
132
27
92
Ghana
1970
49
107
21
Late
1970s
55
86
15
0.7
1. 2
14
86
35
40
92
55
97
14
86
35
40
95
56
- - 36
38 (46) 64 (75) 69 (80)
27 30
3.9
60-65
30-35
1980s
53
107-120
25-30
30
0.4
0.26
48
75
60
30
65
44
68
50-55
-(80)
35-45
Low Income sub- 
Saharan Africa 
(1982)
48
118
24
45
2(f)
0.95
14
62
22
0.85
67-1/2- 
7 2-1/2 
45-50
25
69
32
91
40
69 (-) 
44
2.81
65
35
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Principal Sources
World Bank, Comparative Analysis and Data Division, 
Economic Analysis and projections Department (June 
1984), World Development Report 1985; UNICEF, Statistics 
on Children in UNICEF Assisted Countries (April 1985); 
UNICEF Ghana; Situation Analysis of Women and Children 
(July 1984).
Notes
a) 1960 data refer to a year between 1959 and 1961; 1970 
between 1969 and 1971; late 1970s between 1975 and 
1980; 1980s to 1982, 1984 or 1985.
b) Defined in terms of location within a 5 kilometre 
radius. May overstate for urban population when 
facilities available are small.
c) 1970 and late 1970s urban figures may be overstated 
by failing to relate number of water points to 
population.
d) 1970 and 1978 figures for urban and possibly rural 
areas overstate by failing to relate number of 
drop-holes to supposed user population.
e) Adjusted for length of primary cycle. ( ) are
unadjusted figures. Because of the primary/middle 
school division Ghana has a shorter primary cycle 
than most SSA countries.
f) Estimate made by author based on fragmentary data.
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Notes
1. The attempt to separate technical and normative 
production and distribution issues in applied economics 
is a fairly recent heresy or fad following about 20 
centuries during which they were viewed as integrally 
interrelated.
2. See, for example, T . Rose (ed) , 1985, Crisis and
Recovery In Sub-Saharan Africa:___ Real i t ies And
Complex i t ies; R. H. Green (ed.) 1985 Sub-Saharan Africa:
towards oblivion or reconstruction, Journal of
Development Planning; No. 15; P. Ndegwa, L. p. Mureithi 
and R. H. Green (eds), 1985, Development Options For
Africa In The 1980's and Beyond, Oxford University 
Press, Nairobi; World Bank, 1984, Toward Sustained 
Development In Sub-Saharan Africa: A Joint Programme Of
Action, Washington, D.C.
3. The most complete general example is usually seen as
being the World Bank's 1981 Accelerated Development in 
Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda For Action, of which
Allison and Green published a detailed review and 
critique in 1983.
4. Governors sometimes did, by the nature of their posts, 
take a more territorially self contained view with some 
impact on territorial, but much less on overall, 
colonial policy.
5. A reading of a random selection of colonial bluebooks, 
reports, minutes and semi-analytical pieces - including 
Fabian ones on endeavours such as the post 1945 
groundnut schemes - rapidly brings home the colonial 
economy in the service of the metropolitan economy 
focus, as opposed to African welfare or even overall 
territorial development, of colonial conceptualisation 
even when dealing with topics such as wages, employment 
or peasant production. Again some governors - for 
example, Sir Gordon Guggisberg in the Gold Coast and 
Lord Lugard in Nigeria - were partial exceptions even if 
rather technocratic and paternalistic in their approach 
to the welfare of Africans and conceptually shaky in 
their delineation of how to expand territorial 
production.
6 . In German East Africa (Tanzania) examination of German 
tombstones suggests that diseases killed at least one 
German per mile of rail built, while West Africa's 
European health condition was as much described as 
caricatured by the tag 'The Bight of Benin where many go 
in; but few come out again'.
7. Unpublished Tanzania data suggest a 3 to 2 ratio of 
minimum wage consuming power to that of the average
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peasant household; scattered West African estimates 
include several of the same order in the mid-1970s. 
Much higher estimates usually compare peasant cash 
incomes with all urban income earners, or value peasant 
self provisioning in food at farmgate prices and worker
food at urban retail prices both of which distorts real
consuming power differentials.
8 . Centred on the ILO's World Employment Programme and 
'Basic Needs' conceptualisation (cf. Employment, Growth 
and Basic Needs; A One World Problem, ILO, Geneva, 1976) 
and the World Bank's 'Absolute Poverty' 
conceptualisation and projects toward its eradication.
9. In fact in most countries of sub-Saharan Africa a fairly 
steady post 1970 increase in policies aimed at enhancing 
growth of food production backed by generally increased 
resource allocations has paralleled a worsening achieved 
output growth trend, despite grower price/urban wage 
terms of trade shifts in favour of domestic food over 
most of the period. There are exceptions and it is
probable that the causal relationship runs from the 
negative output trend to the policy/resource packages 
and not vice versa, but even on the most favourable
reading, policy was not in fact effective and resource 
allocations were not efficient in production payoff 
terms.
10. See sources cited at Note 2 especially Sub-Saharan
Africa; Towards oblivion or reconstruction
(contributions by S. Please and R. H. Green) and Toward 
Sustained Development in Sub-Saharan Africa.
11. Real wage falls of over 50 per cent since the mid-1970s
are common and 75 per cent ones not uncommon. Given
base levels of consumption these must have been 
partially offset by rises in other components of
household income. Otherwise the household members would 
literally be unhoused, naked and starving or dead.
12. The accuracy of these data is certainly open to
question. 80 per cent averages taken literally would
imply starvation w a s  ram p a n t  among at l e a s t  the b o t t o m  
fifth of the food distribution and 68 per cent would 
suggest half the people were in the grip of a major 
famine. There is some reason to believe FAO (and 
national) estimates in some countries understate food 
availability, and that up to a point low height and
weight represent adaptation to conditions of low food 
availability which do reduce minimum nutritional levels 
consistent with health. However, there is no reason to 
doubt the pattern of declining availability shown in 
many cases for over a decade and for almost all since 
the late 1970s. Equally, adaptation cannot explain the 
high and rising levels of clinical malnutrition in
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children which are based on less globalistic criteria, 
nor explain away the very real micro and qualitative 
evidence of chronic inability to work hard, to study 
effectively, to benefit from health care which are 
reported, even under non-famine conditions, in most SSA 
countries.
13. Thus Northern and Upper Ghana are usually perceived as 
food deficit areas. In nutritional terms they most 
certainly are. But they are substantial net food (yams, 
groundnuts, cattle and to a lesser extent millet and 
guinea corn) exporters to the rest of Ghana and to 
Burkina Faso, except in the most severely drought 
affected years, because most peasant households have no 
alternative way of meeting basic cash purchase 
requirements. (The regional rice surplus is less 
relevant to the argument as it comes from land 
extensive, capital intensive, large, mechanised farms, 
not peasant growers.)
14. Perceptions may be wrong - see, e.g Note 26 - but if 
acted on they do have objective results and are a real 
cause of decisions.
15. How 'efficient' is defined is not always clear since the
assumed shadow prices and costs used to flag supposedly 
efficient units or sub-sectors are problematic,
imprecise and volatile in the extreme. E.g. in 1984 at 
the illegal market exchange rate, Tanzania apparently 
had a comparative disadvantage in producing maize and a 
comparative advantage in producing electrical 
distribution equipment, while in 1985 it appears to have 
a comparative advantage in both.
16. This is one issue on which 'new conventional wisdom' and
alternative approaches are in broad agreement. Most 
African agriculture ministries, contractors and
consultants to large scale projects and some World Bank 
country programmes, however, tend to take the reverse 
position; quite why is unclear for the first and last 
groups as the overall empirical record hardly supports 
them.
17. However, simply demobilising (in the sense of firing) or
not providing adequate rations and living wages to 
soldiers is not a viable form of cut. Quite predictably 
it is conducive to total indiscipline and uncontrollable 
living by taking on the part of the soldiers. A 
significant portion of Uganda's 1981-85
security/security force catastrophes relate directly to 
such fiscal balance oriented 'savings'.
18. World Development Report statistics do not suggest 
substantial cuts in health or education shares of total 
spending - especially if debt service is excluded.
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19. In health for example it is very easy to cut vaccination 
campaigns and transport; relatively easy to cut rural
primary health care, patient diets and - because foreign 
exchange availability gives an exogenous limit — drug 
and equipment supply; rather harder to reduce central
hospital maintenance and hardest to retrench on
personnel (albeit not to lower their real emoluments by
holding them static or increasing them moderately in 
the face of rampant inflation). Staff without adequate 
pay, in crumbling buildings, with next to no drugs or 
transport are unlikely to be able to sustain a 
meaningful medical service.
20. For example, in Tanzania the rate of growth of Domestic 
Credit Formation is about half that of inflation as 
measured by the cost of living index. On the face of it 
this is a highly restrictive policy and one which would 
need positive real interest rates to balance supply and 
demand without severe overall credit rationing. In 
practice the commercial banking sector is relatively 
liquid and enterprise sector DCF increases are well 
below limits, raising doubts as to what a 'market 
clearing' interest rate actually would be.
21. In more technical terms poor people can be expected to 
have high positive time and risk avoidance preferences. 
The internal logic implicit in existing structural 
adjustment programmes often calls for low preferences on 
both counts.
22. Arguably such shifts - especially within health - are 
incorporated in both Zimbabwean and Tanzanian structural 
adjustment policies. However, in neither case is the 
shift the result of clear macro articulation, and since 
neither Zimbabwe nor Tanzania has secured World Bank 
structural adjustment loans (nor a sustained IMF high 
credit tranche stabilisation agreement) there is a 
tendency to view their policies as not constituting 
structural adjustment. Both have been atypical in 
perceiving structural adjustment as a precondition for 
full stabilisation, not vice versa, even though both 
accept that initial imbalance reduction is necessary for 
structural adjustment to be effective. In Zimbabwe 
1984-85 results suggest substantial success in 
stabilisation and some in structural adjustment, whereas 
in Tanzania substantial 1981-85 progress in structural 
adjustment has been rendered less than fully effective 
by distinctly limited success in attempts to reduce 
external and domestic resource imbalances.
23. For a programmatic sketch see Daniel, Lipton, and Green 
1985.
24. Higher productivity is basic - in the context of most
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informal sectors in sub-Saharan Africa - to higher real 
incomes. Reduction of exploitation may often also be 
necessary, but until they are able to raise their 
productivity most informal sector employees/self 
employed cannot achieve minimum adequate household 
incomes no matter how fairly they are paid for what they 
produce.
25. Interestingly, the World Bank's variant of the 'new 
conventional wisdom' has never fully lost sight of this 
point and has recently begun to reassert it. Some of 
the production oriented justifications of education and 
health are rather distressingly formulated - they would 
make equal sense if the 'objects' discussed were 
machines or cattle - but the underlying point that the 
productionist case reinforces the human concern one for 
basic services is an important and powerful one.
26. Contexts - not the sub-Saharan African context. For 
example, food stamps for poor households might be a 
fiscally and administratively feasible food security 
approach in Mauritius but pretty clearly not in - say - 
Mauretania. Similarly large inter year grain storage 
may make little sense in Botswana which is bordered by 
two large grain exporters and has a relatively 
satisfactory foreign exchange position; in Zambia both 
foreign exchange constraints and the need to restructure 
the economy away from mining point in the other 
direction.
27. This may be unfair to decision takers. With crop yields 
uncertain until harvest and the procurement/shipment 
time required long, it is prudent not to close down food 
aid (or other import) pipelines prematurely. However, 
the same cure of minimum grower prices and reserve 
stocks would fit equally well to alleviate the problems 
resulting from such prudence.
The role of better stoves is controversial. Those
developed are with few exceptions so unpopular as to
suggest serious design or overlooked side effect 
weaknesses. In any case substituting a purchased stove 
for three stones to save wood produced (collected) by 
direct labour input is not a practical prescription for 
poor rural households to follow.
29. The critique on the grounds of collection cost is far
from radical - it is standard Treasury practitioner 
wisdom aggregated from experience. That on indirect 
costs to unpaid collectors is not one Treasuries are so 
prone to make, but is one they recognise and to a degree 
accept - precisely because their experience is that
heavy collection burdens on non-Treasury institutions or 
enterprises result in protests, need to pay collection 
fees and/or very poor collection rates. Many of the
28.
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detailed fee schemes proposed appear to be academic or 
'ideological' in the perjorative sense - it is hard to 
suppose their authors have any knowledge of revenue 
management and collection and on occasion charging the 
user seems to be the goal in and of itself whether the 
net revenue secured is substantial, negligible or even 
negative. Perhaps the author is biased because for nine 
years he was a practising Treasury civil servant 
responsible inter alia for devising administratively 
feasible and cost efficient revenue measures and 
structures.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
The struggle against poverty and for human condit ions o f  life by and  
for poor peop le  is not new . neither is it on e  limited to the poor  
countries o f  the south nor is it a static on e .  Participation in it -  from the 
T em p le  C om m ission  on un em p loy m en t  in the U K  o f  the 1930s, 
through the early days o f  the U nited  Nations' eco n om ic  d eve lop m ent  
effort beginning at the end o f  the 1940s, and the International Labour  
Organisation’s W orld E m p loym en t Program m e in the 1970s to his 
present service with U N IC E F  -  has been an abiding and integral part 
o f  Hans Singer’s devotion  to applied econ o m ics  as a vocation  -  
econ om ics  in its original Old T estam ent sense o f  stewardship and 
m eeting material n e e d s .1 Nor is Hans a n ew com er to Africa -  from the 
founding o f  the E con om ic  C om m ission  for Africa as the 1950s turned  
into the 1960s, through the 1970s Kenya ILO E m ploym ent Mission to  
the 1984 U N IC E F  State o f the World's Children R eport, and study o f  
the impact o f  the depression on children in Africa (Singer and G reen ,  
1984), there is a span o f  twenty-five years o f  work.
O ver that period sub-Saharan Africa has b eco m e independent;  
begun to grapple with both poverty and productivity; appeared to
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achieve  (in a majority o f  states) a real if limited and imperfect  
d ev e lo p m en t  m om en tu m ; and, since the end o f  the 1970s, fallen into  
sustained eco n o m ic  unsuccess in all but a small minority o f  cou ntr ie s .2
That unsuccess has usually been sketched in terms o f  m a cr o ec o n o ­
mic or political eco n o m ic  aggregate levels and trends (for exam p le  in 
W orld Bank, W orld D evelopm ent Reports and in the bulk o f  the 
contributions to the sources cited at 2 ),  and flashed on television  
screens in im ages o f  mass starvation. T he first abstracts from, and  
anaesthetises  against, the human m eaning o f  eco n om ic  disintegration  
- p e n u r y ,  hunger, il lness, p lague, societal distintegration (at least the  
outriders and forward projected  shadow s o f  the four h orsem en o f  the  
apocalypse) .  T he  latter num bs by its ham m er blows o f  horror, and  
creates  a situation in which the struggle to m eet the im m ediate  
necessity  o f  maintaining life can push aside the need  to alter the 
condit ions which in their extrem e form endanger  life on a mass basis,  
but in their more general and more persistant form erod e ,  degrade and  
shorten it in less dramatic but no less dam nable  ways.
T he reactions to eco n o m ic  unsuccess in sub-Saharan Africa have  
n been  dom inated  by two lines:
(a) the new  conventional w isd om '2 centred on IMF stabilisation and  
World Bank structural adjustment models; and
(b) the em ergen cy  fam ine relief focus on keeping human beings alive.
T he need to  balance resources used with resources available -  
stabilisation -  is irrefutable. N o  eco n om y can avoid stabilisation  
indefinitely and multiterm, massive im balance leads to condit ions  at 
least as deadly  to human welfare as to G D P  growth. T he basic 
questions are o n es  o f  distribution o f  costs,  timing and -  most critical -  
the relevant roles o f  cutting resource use versus increasing d om estic  
(produced) and external (transferred) resource supply. Similarly  
structural adjustm ent to raise production and productivity generally ,  
and in particular to im prove the balance o f  external resources and food  
availability relative to requirem ents,  is not itself  controversial. In very  
p oor  countries especia lly ,  even  though grow th without deve lop m en t  is 
all too  poss ib le ,  d e ve lop m en t  without growth is not. H o w ev er ,  it is not 
the same thing to affirm that production is essential and to encapsulate  
that advice as ‘S eek  ye first the kingdom o f  production and all e lse  shall 
be added unto y o u ’. There  are very real questions o f  distribution  
(dom inantly  turning on w ho is able to produce what, not on  
subsequent transfer paym ents) ,  o f  basic service levels (both in respect 
to minimum humanly acceptable  standards and to ability to produce) ,
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and o f  timing o f  gains as o p p o sed  to costs (poor peop le  have very  
narrow survival margins and it is a brutal fact that the poor are dead in 
the short, not even  in the long, run).
T he em ergency  efforts to avoid mass death do relate to an 
im m ediate  overriding necessity . For the dead there is no future. By 
th em selves  they do not answer what o n e  is keeping peop le  alive for. in 
the sense  o f  what they will be able to m ake o f  their lives. Mass  
starvation in sub-Saharan Africa to date has been  triggered by the 
interaction o f  drought, weak transport systems and war (and  
threatened, albeit to date  averted , when the first two interacted  
particularly savagely). But it has been triggered both because  the  
margin b etw een  ‘norm al’ food supply and starvation is narrow, and 
increasingly narrowing in a majority o f  the reg ion’s countries ,  and  
because  most poor households have neither the se l f-em ploym en t nor  
w age em p lo ym en t  opportunity either to grow enough  to eat or to be 
productive and well rewarded enough  to buy adequate  food. In normal  
years, inability to buy f o o d - n o t  its physical u n a v a i la b i l i ty - is  the main  
cause o f  urban malnutrit ion (see  Reutlinger, 1985). That reality 
underlies the fam ine crises and remains even  when reasonable rains 
return (see  P lease, 1985 and G reen .  1985b) -  as they did in many, not 
all. drought affected areas in the 1984-5 cropping seasons. Further­
m ore, peasants w ho have lost herds, tools,  seed  and other  m eans o f  
farming, especially  if also driven from their hom es into urban areas or 
relief cam ps by the search for food , cannot resume production as if 
nothing had happened . Flight from the land will be both difficult and  
slow  (Burki,  1985).
N either  o f  these two approaches directly addresses the challenge o f  
persistent and deve lop in g  poverty. E ven when m any sub-Saharan  
Africa ec o n o m ies  had positive per capita output growth not reversed  
by negative terms o f  trade shifts, absolute poverty at best declined  
slowly as a proportion o f  total population and even  then often rose in 
absolute  num bers o f  human beings affected. Similarly basic service  
expansion  while very real is -  with the partial exception  o f  primary  
education  -  very far from achieving universal access in most states. In 
1980 malnutrition in sub-Saharan Africa, defined as not enough  
calories for an active working life, rose to 44 per cent o f  the population  
-  150 million human beings -  while 25 per cent - 9 0  million -  w ere also  
b e lo w  the calories need ed  to avert stunted growth and serious health  
risk. B oth  the percentages and the absolute numbers represented  
deterioration  since 1970 (W orld B ank, 1986; Reutlinger, 1985). The 
1970s concerns with em p loy m en t  (for exam ple  the World E m p lo y ­
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ment Programme’s country teams, such as the one to Kenya), peasant  
productivity, the ‘informal sec tor ’, basic service access ,  distribution  
and enabling the poor to b eco m e  less poor by producing more (or 
being more fairly paid),  related to very real human and econ om ic  
problems. T hey  self-evidently  remain valid in the 1980s as absolute  
poverty rises and basic services decay , even  if the som ew hat  
reductionist em phasis  on  productivity and survival has for the time  
being swept them to the margins o f  d ia logue and -  with e x c e p t i o n s - o f  
resource allocation . T he  concern with persistent poverty is not a new  
o n e  in econ o m ics  nor o n e  associated  solely  with particular ideologies .  
It was after all A d a m  Smith w ho  m ade it a p rem ise that no nation could  
be great and prosperous, the majority o f  w h ose  peop le  were poor and 
miserable.
The w ea kn ess  o f  con ven tiona l  stabilisation and structural adjust­
ment strategies is not their focus on regaining balance b etw een  
resource availability and use, still less their insistence on the need to 
increase and to alter the m ak eup  o f  production to ach ieve  and to 
sustain balance. It is the absence  o f  two additional priorities which is 
open to question . T h ese  are:
(a) non-deferral o f  m eet ing  basic needs  -  with special reference to 
food ,  water, health and education;
(b) priority to increasing productivity o f  and access to services by poor  
people  and vulnerable groups.
There is no reason to assum e that these goals  are either econ o m ic  or 
socio-political n on sen se .  T he en o rm o u s  cost o f  inadequate diet in 
terms o f  health , ability to benefit  from ed u cation ,  capacity to work  
hard in lost present and future output terms is increasingly widely  
recognised (R eu tl in ger ,  1985; W orld  B ank, 1986; U N I C E F ,  1985b). 
Similarly the social dis integration and political instability caused by 
the im miseration o f  grow ing num bers o f  p eop le  w ho were formerly  
productive, non-destitute  m em bers  o f  their societies  and eco n o m ies  
has high potential e co n o m ic  costs; active in the cases o f  disorder and 
insurrection, passive in those  o f  retreat from involvem ent in state  
policy and reversion to an ‘each for h im self  and the devil take the 
hindm ost’ variant o f  e co n o m ic  and social neo-anarchy.
The em ergen cy  relief efforts w eak n esses  are rather different. They  
d o  recognise that basic n eeds  cannot be deferred and that helping  
human beings stay alive matters. What they have failed to do in the 
past is to  pose  two further questions:
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(a) how' can these peop le  have a future -  and o f  what k in d - a f t e r  their 
lives have been  saved?
(b) how- can em ergency  aid be designed and utilised as a first step  
towards self-re-establishm ent including increased/restored pro­
duction/earned incom e by the recipients?
Bob G eldof's  horrified com m en ts  on the need  to consider what  
Bandaid was keeping p eople  alive for (i .e .  what human condition they  
faced) illustrates the growing concern with the first question. The  
second has been nibbled at both by analysts and practitioners but 
mainline action remains to treat it as unhandleable  because  
em ergencies  are unpredictable, time short and relief logically  
separable from deve lop m en t.
T R A N S I T I O N S  F R O M  P O V E R T Y  T O  P O V E R T Y
Poverty in sub-Saharan Africa is a historic fact -  as it is virtually  
universally. There  was no go lden age before the E uropeans came  
when the land flowed with sorghum , millet and yams, with guinea  
fowl, cattle and fish, with palm oil , groundnuts and garden eggs, with 
banana beer, coconut spirits and palm w ine, so that all were well fed  
and prosperous. But it would be equally false to treat poverty as 
primordial, unchanging and -  implicitly -  permanently immutable and 
inevitable.
Pre-colonial poverty turned primarily on submarginal or erratic 
rainfall and on technological (and therefore productivity) limitations  
in relation to sub-Saharan Africa's on average poor and difficult soils. 
The human condition was equally  constrained by inadequate health  
know ledge, practices and services which shortened life and eroded  
strength. Africans, not E uropeans,  have always been  the ch ief  victims  
o f  African d iseases and so-called adult African resistance to, for 
exam ple ,  malaria often m eans no more (and no less) than that 
vulnerable individuals died o f  it as children.
N o n e  o f  this den ies  that Africans did deve lop  technologies:  som e  
long fallow rotation system (so-called ‘shifting cultivation ) related  
admirably and sustainably to poor soils with limited, uncertain rainfall 
so  long as populations were small and the only large dem and on the 
land was for food; som e  herbal and parapsychological medical 
practices were far more than c om m on  sense  or trial and error. Still less 
d oes  it deny cultural and social ach ievem ents .  The fact remains that for
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many Africans hunger was an annual occurrence, disease a frequent  
o n e ,  life short, and death an ever  present danger unleashable by 
unpredictable and technological ly  unm anageable  w eather shifts and 
disease outbreaks.
Pre-colonial neo-co lon ia l ism  -  o f  slave traders and merchants  
manipulating African polities and agents -  unleashed two additional 
causes o f  poverty and human misery. T he first was the slave trade and 
the social and eco n o m ic  w aste lands it created (still writ plain in the low  
present population  o f  most o f  N iger ia ’s middle belt almost a century  
after the trade ceased ) .  T he  secon d  was the rise in the num ber and 
ferocity o f  wars -  and the killing pow er available to armies -  largely 
directly or indirectly triggered and/or m ade possible by European  
and, secondarily,  Arabian interventions (see  R od n ey , 1972).
Colonialism in Africa rarely meant territorial eco n o m ic  d e v e lo p ­
ment even in m odern m a cro econ o m ic  terms. G ross territorial produet 
-  as op p osed  to certain products o f  use to the colonising p ow er  and its 
trading partners -  was rarely o f  central concern. Jam es M ill’s 
definition o f  a co lony  as a place in which the colonising p ow er found it 
convenient to  carry out som e  o f  its business (e .g .  mining, cutting  
tropical t imber, buying or growing tropical crops) provides much more  
insight into the nature o f  e co n o m ic  policy than any definition  
presupposing co lon ies  were seen  primarily as territorial econ o m ic  
units in their ow n right.4
A s  a direct result, poverty o f  Africans was not an econ o m ic  concern  
which could appear on the colonial agenda as more than a foo tn o te .  A  
large export sector  with a supporting food  and service sector could  on  
occasion reduce poverty -  a result not u n w elcom e to many colonial  
administrators. A vo id in g  mass starvation (by price juggling, reserve  
holding, fam ine relief and even  food  for work policies which have a 
haunting familiarity o f  kind if not scale to 1970s and 1980s efforts) were  
som etim es priorities — for ex a m p le ,  in the then Tanganyika M a n d a te -  
and did end mass starvation. But A d am  S m ith ’s dictum ■•>n the need tor 
the majority to be n on -poor  and non-m iserable  as a precondit ion for 
colonial e co n o m ic  success would  have been  either incom prehensib le  
or seen as at least as subversive as the writings o f  Karl M a r x /
E ducation  for Africans was perceived  e ither as a by-product o f  
missionary en d eav ou r  (vaguely  b acked , tolerated or curtailed in terms 
o f  its supposed  social and political impact -  which was usually far more  
and far m ore deep ly  ‘sub vers ive’ than co lonial administrators, or 
missionaries! realised) or as an investment in clerks, semi-skilled  
labour and o ther  human interm ediate inputs into the colonial
84 Sub-Saharan  A frica
econ o m y . The calculations were not in sophisticated econom etric  
terms, hilt colonial education  policy was early (and severely cost 
constrained) human resource d eve lop m en t  school in concept -  even  
w hen it flowered to secondary and medical assistant levels. Health  
facilities for Africans (and until late in the colonial period often for 
Europeans6) were even  more ex iguous and dependent on  missionary  
subsidisation o f  the colonial state.
H ow ever ,  the nature o f  poverty changed. C olonial rule did reduce  
death from war (caused by dislocation and subsequent starvation or 
ep idem ic  disease more than by battle casualities); it did end the slave  
trade; frequently it did provide fail-safe fam ine relief against mass  
starvation . T hese  shifts probably both increased life expectancy  and (by 
reducing d islocation) raised rates o f  increase o f  foo d  production.  
Exploitative as it was, colonial production prom otion /coercion  on  
average probably raised the com m a n d  o f  many African households  
over goo d s  and services. W hile there were exceptions  (especially  in the  
case o f  settler co lon ies ) ,  the territories in which most Africans were  
most likely to b e  poor and miserable  were those like then Haute V olta  in 
which, a la Joan R obinson 's  form ulation, the colonial pow er and its 
enterprises could find no w orthwhile  way o f  exploiting them.
P o v e r ty -o r  at least human d e p r iv a t io n -w a s  also altered in its nature 
in additional ways. The first was the im position o f  external rule with its 
impact on polity , society , self- im age and self-set standards -  clearly a 
negative shift. The second  was the beginnings o f  education  and health  
services which both im proved the human condit ion o f  recipients and 
gave them -  and o ther  A fricans -  a fuller picture o f  what they were (for  
whatever reason) still deprived  o f  (a much greater force in both aspects  
with the late colonial education  and health services ‘b o o m ’). T he third 
was an increase in population  growth (presumably related to the  
indirect effects o f  law and order including fam ine relief and ability to 
produce m ore) ,  which began to create pressure on land o f  plausible  
quality and security o f  rainfall (m ost severely  where colonists or 
plantations had reduced the supply available). This trend was probably  
not very significant in most areas at the time but laid the foundations for 
much more generalised and severe  problem s over  the last twenty years.
1960-79: D E V E L O P M E N T  B Y  M O D E R N I S A T I O N
D e v e lo p m e n t - o r  at least growth and expansion  o f  both production and  
basic services -  sp eed ed  up in the region as a w hole  and in most
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sub-Saharan e c o n o m ie s  over  the two decades  after ind ep en d ence .  The  
dominant basic pattern was arguably a more intensive colonial mise en 
valeur em phasis  on  m odernisation  and expansion  o f  se lected  output  
subsectors and related infrastructure, paralleled by more intensive and  
extensive human resource investment oriented  education ,  and rather 
more attention to health and water supply. H o w ev er ,  at least o n e  
sectoral addition -  import substitution industry, o n e  subsectoral shift -  
towards high capital intensity irrigated and m echanised  agriculture,  
and one perspective  shift -  to see  an African state as a se lf-contained  
unit for policy purposes (not an ap p en d age  o f  a broader unit centred  
abroad) were increasingly ev ident over  time.
Output per capita and service provision coverage  did rise ( see  World  
Bank, 1981). T he  advance was u n e v e n - t h e  least favoured countries  in 
natural resource or location terms and those with chronic policy  
failures did not share significantly in it -  slow  and unstable , but real. 
Ironically, on average the best four years were 1976-9 , the recovery  
following the 1973-5 shocks and preceding the 1980-5 debacle  (see  
sources in note  2).
Poverty, defined  as low -incom e hou seh o ld  inability to m eet basic 
consumption needs, was neither rapidly nor consistently reduced. T he 
basic cause was a failure o f  w ages and reasonably productive  
se lf-em ploym ent to rise much -  if at all -  more rapidly than population  
plus a failure o f  productivity increases to b eco m e accessible to the 
poorest quarter to half o f  peasant households .  Basic service accessibil­
ity did rise, albeit o ften  so slowly that absolute num bers without access  
rose even though a grow ing share o f  the p eop le  was served.
While mass starvation was -  with very rare excep tions  -  averted , it is 
doubtful that season a l ,  cyclical and en d em ic  hunger were reduced  
markedly. From about 1965 on fo o d ,  and from 1970 overall ,  
agricultural production growth lagged behind that ot populat ion  -  a 
source o f  subsequent im m iseration  on three counts: increasing  
inability to m eet  d om estic  foo d  requirem ents from d om estic  produc­
tion; falling per h ou seh o ld  cash in com e from sale o f  tood  or other  
crops; and falling export earnings and therefore ability to sustain  
overall capacity uti lisation and m aintenance  or growth in the early and  
middle 1970s and m ore especially  since 1979.
The reasons for agricultural malaise are co m p lex ,  are not clearly  
understood (especially  in terms o f  weight and interaction) and until 
the 1980s had very distinct d ivergences from country to country. In 
respect to poor farmers three stand out: concentration  ot resources in 
ways which left the small, isolated farmer with a low initial incom e
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unable to raise output; increasing population/land ratios; and static 
proven knowledge (and access to inputs), leading to smaller holdings,  
more intensive land use unsustainable under existing systems, pushing on 
to poorer and or higher weather-risk land. A s these households usually 
produce primarily domestic food crops (with sales for cash a deduction  
from what are often at least marginally inadequate self-provisioning),  
and effective domestic food prices after 1960 did not in general show a 
cyclical fall relative to wages, there is some doubt how significant 
peasant/worker terms o f  trade shifts and state price policy (rarely 
effective for domestic food crops) were directly, except for the minority 
who produced export crops which clearly did suffer from world domestic  
terms o f  trade shifts and increases in (public and also private) marketing  
costs relative to export prices.
While still constituting a small proportion o f  total absolutely poor  
households, urban poverty (in low productivity, informal sector, self-or 
wage-employment) began to grow very rapidly. Whether the urban 
absolutely poor households were much less poor than the poorest half of  
peasant households in physical consuming power terms7 is unclear and 
probably varied sharply among countries. What they did have was 
somewhat better access to basic services and a far higher chance -  at least 
for som e -  to win their way out o f  absolute poverty than that o f  most of 
the poorer half of peasant households.
In the 1970s, concern about low growth o f  employment and o f  rural 
household incomes led to a substantial employment, technology, urban 
renewal and rural developm ent studies industry and some pilot projects,8 
most to fall victim o f  post 1979 increases in resource stringency. Likewise  
concern over low food production growth led to increased real resource  
(including infrastructural investment and marketing working capital), 
institutional and policy attention to this subsector, often with renewed  
concentration o f  attention away from poor households and in most cases 
with no very evident net positive impact on production.9 Finally the late 
I960s/early 1970s falling off o f  growth and the negative 1974—5 growth 
during the first external shock crises led (during the 1976-9 high growth 
period) to a set of studies which formed the basis o f  the new conventional 
wisdom on stabilisation and structural adjustment, appearing as they did 
after the 1960-79 developm ent dynamic had gone into reverse in almost  
all o f  sub-Saharan Africa.
1979-??: T H E  R E S U R G E N C E  O F  P O V E R T Y
Since 1979 the general performance ot the region's econom ies has been
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disastrous. T he com bination  o f  negative per capita physical output  
growth, falling external terms o f  trade and declining net external  
resource inflows (abso lute ly  as well as per capita) have reduced real 
per capita com m and  over  resources to be low  1970 levels for 
sub-Saharan Africa as a w h o le ." 1 T he World Bank's optimistic  
projections suggest no regional real output per capita recovery over  
1985-95 and possibly so m e  further deterioration on net per capita 
inflows and terms o f  trade (W orld B ank, 1984).
On what has caused  this massive shift o f  direction there is substantial 
agreem ent that external shocks (including w eather) ,  narrow margins 
for riding them  out and the cum ulative  impact o f  over  a d ecade  and a 
half o f  agricultural n on-success  were major factors. T here  is also 
agreem ent that g overn m ent  polic ies  were not optimal (not that they  
had been  over  1960-79 e ither) and were adjusted to contextual  
disasters too  s low ly , and that for so m e  polities civil war/state  
disintegration and/or external aggress ion , which, for instance, cost 
the nine S A D C C  states about $10 000 million over  1980-4 or well 
over total external resource inflows for the period (S A D C C ,  1985). 
were also decis ive causes. The specific weights of particular causes  
(and especially  their interaction and their applicability to specific  
countries) are not agreed (see  A llison  and G re e n ,  1985 and sources at 
note 2) nor are the directions in which policies erred (as op p osed  to 
fairly pervasive overam bition  in scope  and underperform ance in 
practice).
In 1984, U N IC E F 's  Im pact o f  W orld Recession on C hildren was able 
to produce a broad array o f  suggestive and scattered empirical data but 
no statistics com parable  to those  in the World Bank s annual World 
Developm ent Reports. This was especially  true tor sub-Saharan Africa 
(see Singer and G ree n ,  1984). 1 he annual Statistics on Children in 
UNICEF A ssisted Countries (U N I C E F ,  1985) illustrates the fragm ent­
ary nature o f  relevant data (and the three-year time lag for attaining  
even m oderately  in com p lete  global co v erag e) .
Yet a number o f  topographical e le m en ts  o f  the d eve lop m en t  of 
poverty can be drawn. F ood  production per capita is still declining  
secularly -  and in the early 1980s was severely  cyclically affected bv a 
drought belt extending  from the C ape V erd es  through the Sahel to the 
Sudan and dow n through the Horn and East Africa to the Cape and 
back to the A tlantic  coasts  o f  N am ibia  and A n gola .  T he officially  
estimated ratio o f  average calorie availability relative to basic 
requirem ents fell to 80 per cent in many cases and under 70 per cent in 
som e -  a chilling figure when o n e  realises that it m eans that at least halt
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the human beings in these countries have still less food  than th at ."  
What micro data exist suggest that the farmers hardest hit fall into  
several subgroups:
(a) victims o f  sustained drought and/or ecological degradation  
w h o se  previous sources o f  incom e (including herds, seed  stock,  
land im provem ents)  have been wiped out;
(b) the -  usually poor, often fem ale headed -  h ouseholds  pushed by 
land hunger on to m ore marginal (in terms o f  soil,  w eather,  
ecological fragility) land -  i.e .  the p ioneers o f  the ‘rural sponge'  
effect which has to date limited the rise o f  open  unem ploym ent;
(c) households in isolated or peripheral (to  main urban centres) areas 
w h o tend to be physically and institutionally ( including for private 
enterprise) at the end o f  the line for all g o od s  and services and to  
suffer first and most severely  from decreased  flow levels;
(d) small producers -  usually primarily en gaged  in self-provisioning  
but also selling fo od ,  even  if in nutritional terms they have a 
d ef ic i t ,12 because  it is their basic source o f  cash incom e -  w h o  are 
unable to increase or even  sustain output in the face o f  static  
applicable know ledge and declining access to inputs.
Effective food prices have risen relative to w ages and usually to  
prices but for the groups cited this d oes  little or no good  because  o f  
stagnant or falling output. N o n -fo o d  crop prices have tended  to fall in 
real terms -  often  dramatically -  partly relating to terms o f  trade  
internationally, partly to  currency overvaluation and partly to rising 
marketing costs. This has probably affected poor peasants less 
severely  for two reasons: many non-food  crop producers are not 
am on g  the poorest peasant households; and switches from non-food  to  
food  crops by poor peasant hou seh o ld s  have been  particularly marked  
(at least in som e  areas). H ow ever ,  there are poor peasant households  
presently or formerly primarily dependent on non-food  crops for cash  
incom e w ho have been  severely affected including (e .g .  in northern  
and upper G hana) by having to sell more o f  their already inadequate  
food  production.
Formal recorded w age em p loy m ent  in the region as a w hole  has 
been  nearly static since 1979. M eanw hile ,  real w ages have fallen  
sharply -  often  to the point at which second  and third incom es are 
essential to household  survival. A s  open unem p loym en t is not 
co m m o n  -  only those w ho are not absolutely poor or can dep en d  on  
relatives can afford to be un em p loyed  -  this implies a rapid growth in 
informal sector self  and non-recorded wage em p loy m en t .  Here too
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there was clearly a 'sponge e f fe c t ’ in the 1970s, but o n e  which appears to 
be running into productivity and market limits in the 1980s, at least for 
most you n g , uneducated  and fem ale informal sector m em bers  
Public service provision has fallen. The basic reasons are budgetary  
stringency (with falls in real expenditure leve lson  hea lth ,ed u ca t io n  and  
water co m m o n  and draconic on es  not u n com m on ) and foreign  
exch an ge  shortages ( leading to missing drugs, pump spares, tex tb ook s,  
transport, e tc) .  In som e  cases quantity o f  services has fallen m a rk ed ly -  
for ex am p le ,  rural health in Z am bia and G hana. In m ore, quality has 
declined , for instance, generalised shortages o f  school and medical  
service materials and m aintenance. Supply and/or usability o f  
nominally available services is severely  constrained (e .g .  on average 25 
per cent o f  rural water supply units in Tanzania  are out o f  service at any  
o n e  tim e because  o f  missing spares or fuel).
T he decline  in services has pressed particularly hard on  end o f  the line 
areas -  iso lated rural districts and urban slums -  and on those with 
rapidly grow ing populations, again especially  urban slums but also  
so m e resettlem ent schem es.  Or, more accurately, it has pressed  
particularly heavily on the poor p eop le  living in them . The rise o f  private  
primary schools  and clinics in poor urban areas d oes  indeed indicate that 
poor Africans value these services, but also that the state supplied ones  
are less and less available and/or more and more unsatisfactory.
Raising or reintroducing fees  for basic services has had a negative  
effect on access o f  the poor to health and education , but how much is 
unclear. This is true because there is no uniform pattern o f  fee levels (in 
som e cases  they are probably progressive relative to incom e but not in 
others) ,  waiver possibilit ies and collection levels and because  their  
supposed  use to restore or sustain service levels is not to date very  
evident .
The most recent life exp ectancy  and mortality data suggest that the 
health service cuts may -  in several cases -  have halted or reversed the 
slow im provem ent o f  life exp ectan cy  and decline  o f  infant mortality  
trends which characterised sub-Saharan Africa over 1960-79. M ore  
dramatically d iseases  nearly eradicated in the late 1950s and 1960s (e .g .  
yaws and yellow  fever in G hana) have erupted at ep id em ic  levels and 
remained e n d em ic  because  funds and transport limited c o u n te r -c a m ­
paign duration and coverage. M oderate  and severe  child malnutrit ion  
has reached levels o f  30 per cent or a b ove  in most countries for which  
data exist,  and is approaching 50 per cent in som e  even  exclud ing  famine  
crisis years (U N I C E F ,  1985 and se lected  U N I C E F  country situation  
reports).
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M eanw hile ,  traditional security system s have been erod ed  -  
probably a trend well established in the 1960-79 period but much more  
nakedly evident since. Kinship and locality or origin groups are less 
able to support poor m em bers/relatives -  especially  in urban and 
natural (or other) disaster-stricken rural areas. This is not simply a 
result o f  shifts towards less ex ten ded  families and urban residence,  
relevant as these are. With econ o m ic  contraction few er and fewer  
group m em bers have resources (especially  o f  cash or food )  to spare -  
all boats are sinking lower. Similarly higher cost ,  less available  
transport reduces urban/rural kin and migrant contacts. Reciprocal  
exchange -  food for manufactures -  has probably risen, but this is not 
an avenue accessible to the very poor. T o  exchange on e  must have  
som ething above day to day subsistence (including the cost o f  a trip) to  
start.
The pattern and balance o f  absolute poverty have continued  to shift. 
The worst declines -  excluding drought/war related fam ines -  appear  
to have been am ong urban poor (including for the first time a high 
proportion o f  recorded wage e m p lo y e es ) .  In consum ing pow er terms 
they are now clearly worse o ff  than the majority o f  peasants and their 
former advantages in respect to access to basic services and to chances  
o f  advancing to higher real in com es are increasingly exiguous. Rural 
absolute poverty has grown unevenly  with the general rule ot thumb  
being that hou seh o ld s  in peripheral areas -  geographically ,  politically,  
in absolute agricultural potential or in p er ce iv ed 12 com m ercialised  
production -  have fared w orse on  production and service access quite 
apart from being particularly prone to drought and civil governm ent  
collapse/war debacles .
It is still true that the majority o f  sub-Saharan Africa's poorest o f  the 
poor are in refugee camps and peripheral rural areas, but there is now  
a rapidly growing urban hou seh o ld  category which is almost equally  
immiserised. In most o f  the reg ion ’s e co n o m ies  the net resource flow -  
at existing prices -  is urban to rural, as much in states with an urban as 
in the minority with a rural policy bias. Oddly the clearest exceptions  
are two stabilisation/structural adjustment cases,  Ghana and 
U ganda, which are almost a lon e  in having very high export crop  
taxes. In respect o f  non-food  crops it can be claimed that price 
distortions hide a true rural to urban flow, but with both the trend and
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the post 1979 realignment o f  food  crop prices in favour o f  producers  
over wage earners it is hard to argue the sam e for that subsector. This 
does not, h ow ever ,  mean equal access to basic services for rural areas  
because state revenues from rural househ o ld s  and producers are much  
lower than from mineral and urban, so that expenditure proportional  
to revenue results in substantially higher per capita spending and 
service provision in urban areas (and for both rural and urban elites) .
Table 5.1 sets out the present levels o f  several human condit ion or 
quality o f  life indicators for low -in co m e sub-Saharan Africa as o f  
1982 and their evo lu t ion  in G hana  over  1960-84. T he absolute levels  
are appalling en ou gh  but their G hanaian  evolut ion  is even  more  
dispiriting. M oderate ly  rapid real gains in the 1960s s low ed  down in 
the 1970s and have now  g o n e  into reverse. T w o  im m ediate  basic causal 
inadequacies stand out -  food  production and the budgetary base for 
health and education . W hile  G hana's  period o f  eco n o m ic  unsuccess  
dates to the early 1960s, not 1979, the record o f  change on the human  
condition front d o e s  not appear atypical.  What was hard won over  two  
decades has been  underm ined , erod ed  and threatened with being  
totally swept away in seven  years. T he stifling scent o f  despair is there -  
not universally, not uncondit ionally  but w idely and increasingly.
T O W A R D S  B R O A D E N I N G  T H E  F O R M U L A T I O N  O F  
S T R U C T U R A L  A D J U S T M E N T ?
Structural adjustm ent -  resting on its present tripod o f  production ,  
state borrowing reduction and se lective  liberalisation (or redirection  
o f  intervention) cou ld  have positive im plications tor poor sub-Saharan  
Africans. T h e  first (p rodu ct ion ) leg is a necessary condit ion  for such  
gains. H o w e v e r ,  it w ould  appear equally true that most present  
programm es have unnecessary built in b iases against the poor. Since  
these costs c o m e  early in the adjustment process  and the gains from  
enhanced production later, the tem poral pattern is to require the poor  
to accept high, certain initial costs  for lagged, uncertain gains -  a 
pattern m ore than so m ew h a t  inconsistent with their margins above  
survival or their life e x p e c ta n c y .14
Table  5.1 Selected qualitv of life indicators: 196<Umid-198(k
1%<)
Ghana  
197(1 Late 197<ls 198( Is
1. Average life expectancy at 45
birth
2. Infant mortality rate 132
3. Child death rate 21
4. Access to health facility (b)
5. Public health facility visits 
per person per year
6. Health budget as c/c o f  G D P
7. Access to pure water (c)
Rural
Urban
Total
8. Access to excreta disposal (d)
Rural
Urban
Total
9. Average calorie availability 92 
as a c/c  of  requirements
49
107
21
14
86
35
40
92
55
97
86
15
0.7
14
86
35
40
95
56
88
53
1 0 7 -2 0
25-30
30
0.4
0.26
48
75
60
30
65
44
68
Low-income  
sub-Saharan 
Africa (1982)
48
118
24
45
2(f)
0.95
14
62
~n
25
69
32
91
10. Child malnutrition (M o d ­
erate/Severe)
11. Primary education enrolment  
ratio (e)
12. Adult literacy
13. Education budget as c/c  of  
G D P
14. Proportion of  population be­
low absolute poverty line (f)
Rural
Urban
38(46)
27
64(75)
30
3.9
36
69(80)
60-65
30-5
50-55  
— (80)
35-45
0.85
67-1/2—
72-1/2
45-50
40
69 ( - )
44
2.81
65
35
Sources: W o r ld  B a n k .  C o m p a ra t iv e  Analysis  and D a ta  D iv is ion .  E c o n o m ic  A na lys is  an d  Projections  D ep ar tm e n t  ( J u n e  1984). W o rld
D eve lo p m en t R ep o r t 1985: U N I C E F ,  Statistics on C hildren  in U N IC E F  A ss is te d  C o u n tries  (A pr i l  1985); U N IC E F .  G hana: S itu a tio n  A n a ly s is  
o f  W o m en  a n d  C hildren  (July  1984).
N otes
(a )  I960 d a t a  re fe r  to  a v ea r  b e tw e e n  1959 and 1961; 1970 b e tw ee n  1969 an d  1971; la te r  1970s between 1975 and 1980; 1980s to  1982. 1984 o r  
1985.
(b )  D e f in e d  in te rm s  o f  loca t ion  w ith in  a 5 k i lom etre  radius. M ay o v e rs ta t e  fo r u rb a n  p o p u la t io n  when facilities avai lable a re  sm al l  to  s e rv e  the  
en t i re  p o p u la t io n  nom ina l ly  within  reach of th em .
(c) 1970 an d  late 1970s u rb a n  figures  may be overs ta ted  by fa iling  to  re la te  n u m b e r  o f  w a te r  points to population
(d) 1970 a n d  1978 figures  fo r  u rb a n  and possibly rural a reas  o v e rs ta te  by fai ling to  re la te  n u m b e r  of  drop-holes to s u pposed  u s e r  p o p u la t i o n
(e) A d ju s t e d  for leng th  o f  p r im ary  cycle. ( ) are u n ad jus ted  figures . B eca u se  o f  the  p r im ary  middle school division G h a n a  has a s h o r t e r  
p r im ary  cvclc th a n  m os t  su b -S a h a ran  African countr ie s .
(f) E s t im a te  m a d e  by a u th o r  on  basis o f  f ragm entary  da ta .
94 Sub-Saharan  A frica
There is another -  com plem entary  -  way o f  approaching the 
interaction b etw een  stabilisation linked to structural adjustment and  
poverty. This is to  query w hether  or not success in present structural 
adjustment programm es on their ow n terms is likely to be a sufficient 
condition for reversing the deterioration o f  human condition indica­
tors -  and, much more im portant, the human condit ions -  in 
sub-Saharan Africa.
On the face o f  it the answer is negative unless -  as is most unusual -  
the structural adjustment program m e both posits and achieves a 
sustained output growth rate o f  over  6 per cent and a full recovery o f  
real governm ent basic service spending  (or a targeted, articulated shift 
towards lower unit cost basic health , education  and water and away  
from higher cost, limited access serv ices),  an approach endorsed  by 
the World Bank (1984) but not yet actually built substantially into any 
existing p ro g ra m m e. |S
T he reasoning behind this conclusion  is relatively straightforward:
(a) growth rates o f  4 to 5 per cent before 1979 yielded limited  
reductions in absolute p overty and slow advances in access to basic  
services;
(b) structural adjustment requires raising savings and reducing  
external deficits implying a lower growth o f  dom estic  resource use 
and especially o f  consum ption  than o f  G D P ;
(c) most actual structural adjustment program m es -  even  if not the 
logic o f  structural adjustment -  are biased against basic services  
and production by poor peop le .
This case is accentuated by the fact that almost all program m es have  
received less external finance than external analysts -  notably the  
W orld Bank -  have thought prudent, and have also been  buffeted by 
unanticipated external terms o f  trade and w eather shocks.
What is usually -  and quite reasonably -  v iew ed as the model  
African structural adjustment program m e, that o f  Ghana -  adopted  by 
the Ghanaian governm ent in early 1983 and articulated with substan­
tial Bank and Fund input over the subsequent year -  appears to 
illustrate the point:
(a) output growth has been positive in 1983, 1984 and 1985 -  the first
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three-year run o f  G D P  growth in over twenty years with 1984 and 
1985 growth probably in the 5 to  6.5 per cent range;
(b) very substantial liberalisation has taken place (notably  in respect  
o f  exch an ge  rates and prices);
(c) the govern m en t borrowing requirement has been reduced to 
one-third the average for sub-Saharan Africa relative to G D P  
(albeit by reducing real governm ent spending and the ratio o f  
revenue to G D P  so that both were in 1984-5 am on g  the low est in 
the world);
(d) holding the external financing position in rough balance (and  
reducing arrears) despite  lower than targeted foreign resource  
inflows and lagged export recovery partly due to weather;
(e )  reducing inflation from the order o f  120 per cent in 1983 to 
perhaps 13 per cent in 1985 (adm ittedly  partly because  g o o d  1984 
and 1985 national harvests fo l low ed  1983’s very severe ly  drought  
curtailed crops) and thus achieving positive real interest rates.
It is difficult to envisage a much more successful structural  
adjustment program m e than G hana's  in terms o f  its ow n macro  
production and balance object ives.  But the poverty trend appears to  
remain in the w rong direction. Real cuts in health and education  have  
virtually halved per capita public health service provision since 1981. 
Minimum w age levels can purchase perhaps a seventh o f  a plausible  
household  con su m ption  basket and -  atter late 1985 increases -  remain  
below  1982 real levels. Real food  (but to date not real n on -food)  
grower prices are above  1982 levels, but in the poorest regions even  
1985 output remains be low  1982’s already depressed  leve ls ,  casting  
grave doubts on  w hether most small peasant producers have  
benefited . T h e  situation o f  the -  growing -  proportion  o f  urban  
househ o ld s  in abso lute  poverty is better than at the peak ot the 
drought/food crisis o f  1983—4, but only because  o f  food  output  
recovery and food  price falls which are as e x o g e n o u s  to the structural 
adjustment program m e as the 1983-4 food  prices and availability  
deterioration. Inputs and supporting services (e .g .  research, ex te n ­
sion) relevant to poor farm ers’ ability to increase production are not 
being given priority -  indeed no coherent fram ework exists tor 
enabling such peasants to produce more. Reversal of the fall in real
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health and educational service provision -  and som e reversal o f  
draconic declines in public service real w ages to halt the loss o f  key  
personnel and the moonlighting/unofficial use o f  public resources  
and positions pattern o f  civil servant su r v iv a l -h a s  now  b eco m e a goal,  
but the initial revenue increasing proposals seem  to centre on  user fees  
which are -  on the face o f  it -  likely to  limit access and unlikely td be as 
revenue/co llection  cost efficient as more general tax measures.
In short, the Ghana structural adjustment programm e is a notable  
success in its ow n terms. If sustained, its reversal o f  the declining per 
capita output trend is both a major ach ievem ent and a precondition for 
sustainable poverty reduction/basic service provision. But partly 
because  o f  the formulation o f  so m e  e lem ents  in the programm e and 
even  more because  o f  what it d o es  not include, its effect on basic 
service provision has to date been  negative and on absolute poverty  
uneven  but probably negative both for peasant househo lds ,  the  
poorest rural areas and for urban slum households. This is clearly an 
unsatisfactory result in human terms but also in respect to human  
productive capacity and socio-political sustainability o f  the pro­
gram m e's successful output recovery side. T he question  is what can be 
d on e  -  in G hana and m ore generally in sub-Saharan Africa -  to tace  
poverty issues more directly and with the probability o f  positive short- 
to m edium -term  results within existing and probable future real 
resource constraints?
It should be made clear that by 1983 Ghana clearly did need to 
undertake drastic stabilisation and structural adjustment measures. A  
buildup o f  im balances over  1961-5 had -  desp ite ,  or because  of,  
frequent changes o f  regime and o f  verbal policy -  never been tackled  
seriously either in terms o f  stabilisation or o f  structural adjustment.  
T he underlying strength, viability and growth potential o f  the 
eco n o m y  had been  declining for over  two decades with severe  social 
and political repercussions. A pparent partial recoveries o w e d  more to  
brief cocoa  b oom s than to underlying perform ance, let alone  
purposive policy measures. T he 1983 change o f  course (or seek ing  to 
set on e  as o p p o se d  to drifting) was both necessary and courageous and  
did seek  to tackle certain key w eak nesses .  What is at issue is not that 
but w hether a more inclusive articulation o f  stabilisation and 
adjustm ent, with greater attention to incom e generation  by poor  
people  and to maintaining basic health services and nutritional levels,  
would have been  practicable and desirable on m edium -term  produc­
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tion and productivity as well as human concern grounds.
This question is ftot unique to the present author. It is increasingly  
asked by G hanaians and within the World Bank, not with a view to 
abandoning structural adjustment but to redefining it to be more 
inclusive and more effective . From that perspective it is not useful to 
argue w hether human condit ion  indicator decline over  1983-5 was  
caused by the structural adjustm ent program m e as executed  or not.  
Evidently the decline  began before 1983 and would not have been  
halted by continuation  o f  the 1966—81 policy o f  resolute irresolution. 
Equally ev ident ly  the budgetary m easures adopted  have severely  
damaged the health service. T h e  basic propositions are that the 
present trends are hum anly, politically and econ om ica lly  unacceptable  
and that halting and reversing them  should be specific priorities within  
the structural adjustm ent program m e.
W ITH IN  A F R I C A N  R E A C H ?
The need for em ergen cy  action is agreed in principle and in practice as 
-  at a more speculative and non-tim e-targeted  level -  is that tor basic 
service restoration, making possible  increased production by poor  
peasants and, perhaps, enhancing  opportunities  for informal sector  
em ploym ent and productivity advances. H o w ev er ,  the longer term  
goals are often  seen  as after the crisis and after structural adjustment;  
the em ergency  actions tend to be ep isod ic  and case by case; the two  
phases are not articulated and program m ed as a sequentia l w hole  and  
both sets o f  exercises  are treated as parallel to (at worst as C hristmas 
tree ornam ents on )  production  and balance focused  macro and  
sectoral structural adjustm ent. That is simply not goo d  en o u gh ,  
intellectually or operationally .
E m ergency action is essentia l because  p eop le  are dying but also  
because eco log ica l ,  production and basic service delivery system  
damage on ce  sustained is very hard to reverse and. until reversed, will 
continue to cost lives. T he most ob v iou s  em ergen cy  support m easures  
are food aid and interim basic medical care against killing diseases and 
health condit ions. The first is illustrated (as are its limitations) by the 
responses to the stark vis ions o f  starvation in Africa screened in 
1984-5. The second  is best exem p lif ied  by U N IC E F 's  evolv ing  ‘Child
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Survival R e v o lu t io n ’ program m e including im munisation, anti- 
diarrhoeal salts (oral rehydration), nutritional monitoring, and 
education evolving in certain cases into more integrated but still 
focused primary health care (isolated rural and/or urban slum posts 
and clinics) support.
T hese  programm es are essential . U N I C E F ’s African poster with the 
question and answer bracketing the face o f  a young girl -  ‘What d o  you  
want to be when you grow u p ?’ ‘A l iv e ’ -  sets the initial challenge  
starkly but realistically.
H ow ever,  em ergency  action in sub-Saharan Africa will both need to  
be continued (not necessarily in the sam e areas) for a decade or more  
and to be seen as an initial phase o f  a broader struggle to reduce  
vulnerability and poverty by creating survival security structures based  
in Africa, and involving poor Africans as producers and subjects not 
receivers and objects.  This perspective has several implications for 
em ergency  programmes:
(a) the question -  after survival,  what next? -  should be posed  from  
the start because  o f  its implications for em ergency  programming.  
For exam ple  food  aid. so delivered  as to allow peasants to remain  
in their h om es ,  maintain their social units and prepare for the 
return o f  the rains, is much more conducive to making survival the 
first step to self-rehabilitation than food  aid in mass camps o f  
dis located , totally d ep en d en t  refugees;
(b) similarly the sam e question  implies that -  for exam ple  -  rural 
em ergen cy  food  provision n eed s  to be linked with the inputs  
(seed ,  too ls ,  transport h o m e ,  e tc .)  n eed ed  for an econom ically  
wiped out household  to begin to produce again;
(c) in parallel,  attempts to m eet em ergen cy  health needs should go  
beyond specific injections — e .g .  immunisation/vaccination  
cam paigns and oral rehydration -  to selective support for keeping  
a basic health service functioning, as illustrated by the U N I-  
CEF/Danida basic rural drug provision programme in Tanzania  
and the U N IC E F  inputs into se lected  primary health care posts in 
G hana;
(d) and utilise em ergen cy  inputs -  where possible without delay or 
sclerotic bureaucratisation -  to increase productive and basic 
service capacity and provide a capacity for self-respect and dignity 
to participants (no longer pure recipients or ‘targets’), e .g .  
Z im b a b w e ’s rural public works schem e including agricultural  
infrastructure focused  food for work projects;
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(e) while involving recipients as participants in program m e operation  
and -  to the extent practicable -  coverage and design.
N one of these steps is im possib le .  E m ergency  efforts have been  
needed frequently and repeatedly  in sub-Saharan Africa for over  a 
decade. T hey  will continue to be need ed . T he points outlined above  
are fairly com m o n ly  relevant to articulating programm es. African  
governm ents, international agencies ,  bilateral aid bodies  and vo lun t­
ary organisations can and should plan ahead , both as to basic capacity  
to finance or collect more resources and as to  basic program m e designs  
and checklists . C om b in ed  with better early warning system s on  food  
supply and health situation deterioration  -  and less unwill ingness to  
believe and act on  the data until p eop le  are visibly dying or on the 
verge o f  dying from starvation or ep id em ics  -  such an approach could  
both increase the hum an survival results o f  em ergen cy  program m es  
and make them infinitely m ore effective  as first steps towards  
rehabilitation/self-rehabilitation o f  recipients/participants who  
are, virtually by defin ition , highly vulnerable and absolutely  poor.
Such an approach to em erg en cy  (hum an survival) programm ing has 
definite implications for longer term strategies and possibilit ies for 
reducing absolute poverty and absolute  lack o f  access to basic services. 
First, if em ergency  assistance is to en com p ass  initial rehabilitation it 
both should and can be seen  within the context o f  longer term  
em ploym ent -  food  production -  basic service -  poverty reduction  
strategies both as an initial stage and also as a supporting measure to  
prevent their crippling or destruction when these strategies already  
existed before the em erg en cy .  S econ d , such a perspective suggests  
that the relatively watertight com partm enta lisation  o f  em ergency  
assistance from d ev e lo p m en t  assistance is counter-productive  for both  
and requires critical reassessm ent and ‘structural adjustm ent' .  Third, 
viewed in this way even  em erg en cy ,  hum an survival program m es are 
(or can be) relevant to sustaining and restoring human resources and  
production, and therefore integral to , not an u n w elcom e diversion  
from, structural adjustm ent (R eu tl in ger ,  1985).
The articulation o f  longer term strategies and their c o m p o n en ts  is 
beyond the scope o f  this essay. H ow ev er ,  so m e  areas for attention can 
be flagposted.
First, the production/productiv ity  focus o f  the present World  
Bank structural adjustment approach is crucial. Production is 
important and stripping program m es o f  biases against production by 
poor people neither should nor need  m ean blurring that goal.
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Second , the ach ievem ent o f  less severe external im balance by a 
com bination  o f  higher exports ,  genuine import substitution and more  
concess ional resource transfers is also necessary. Structural adjust­
ment and grow th o f  output are. at least in sub-Saharan Africa, totally  
inconsistent with neo-autarchy. Import strangulation is a fact weighing  
heavily on poor people  in at least half o f  the region. The true dialogue  
is on the nature o f  relationships to the world e c o n o m y , balance o f  
instruments, phasing and practicable timing.
Third, unless governm ent fiscal and m onetary im balances -  and 
continuous resultant pressures for cuts -  can be reduced, the chances  
o f  providing basic production support (ex ten sion ,  research, infrastruc­
ture. credit) and basic services to small peasant and/or non-agricultu-  
ral informal subsectors are negligible. Prudent fiscal and m onetary  
m anagem ent is as integral to ‘eco n o m ic  adjustment with a human  
face' (U N I C E F ,  1985:64ff) as to any o ther  variant.
Fourth, because governm ent resources (f inancial, hum an, physical,  
foreign exchange) are limited, p r io r i t ie s -  i.e .  choices as to what not to 
do as well as what is to be d on e  -  are necessary. For ex am p le ,  if 
primary health care is to be expanded  to universal access in 
sub-Saharan Africa, then its share o f  health resources relative to 
limited access ,  high unit cost curative treatment must be expanded  
w hich may require absolute cuts in the latter. Similarly if production  
enhancem ent by low -incom e peasant farmers is a priority then the 
research, ex ten s ion ,  input supply and other requirem ents to make  
such an increase possible must be made available, even  though this 
m eans reducing allocations to large-scale, m echanised ,  import 
intensive farming (an alteration o f  balance likely to have positive  
production and external balance as well as poverty  reduction results) .
U p  to this point what is p roposed  is not simply consistent with, but 
based on the sam e priority th em es  as, conventional structural 
adjustment strategy and programming. H o w e v e r ,  as argued above ,  
this is not enou gh  if human beings -  and especially poor human beings  
-  are seen  as the subjects and the justification o f  d eve lop m en t.
Fifth, increased food  availability to poor p eop le  is a central goal 
(W orld B ank. 1986). G iven  the external balance position , this means  
either en hanced  production or balanced regional trade expansion  in all 
but a handful o f  cases. But food  availability to the majority o f  
il l-nourished Africans w ho are m em bers  o f  poor peasant households ,  
requires that they be enabled  to produce more (Burki,  1985; World  
Bank, 1986). This is econ om ica lly  feasible -  indeed  much more cost 
efficient than most large-scale agricultural program m es -  and in the
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present food crises context probably politically and intellectually  
feasible as well.  T he problem  is partly technical -  articulating  
contextually relevant program m es based on collecting reasonably  
accurate data and testing/adapting new techniques for application.  
It is also partly institutional and partly resource m anagem ent -  
actually giving priority to  h o es  and field testing, effective extension  
and availability o f  seasonal inputs on t i m e .1(1 N o n e  o f  these technical 
and institutional prob lem s is inherently any harder to solve  than 
those o f  other  agricultural production prom otion  strategies. Similar 
considerations apply to enhancing  poor peasant cash incom e which in 
most cases will co m e  primarily from achieving a genuine  food  surplus 
above h ou seh o ld  se lf-provisioning requirem ents.  This is not to argue  
against increasing non-foo d  crop production for industrial inputs 
(e .g .  co tton )  and for export.  Sub-Saharan A fr ica ’s problem  is o n e  o f  
low agricultural growth not substitution o f  n on -fo od  for food  crops.  
With rational agricultural prices peasants  can judge what balance o f  
crops to produce for se lf-provisioning and for sale and w hether  to 
seek  saleable  surpluses o f  food  or grow' non-food  crops in addition to  
self-provisioning food  production . For ex am p le ,  in som e  drought 
prone areas small peasant farmers are well advised to grow both 
cotton and food  crops, with the former an anti-famine safeguard  
because low rainfall affects cotton  far less ( indeed  in so m e  areas an 
optimal cotton  w eather year results in partial food crop failure and 
vice versa).
Sixth, effective  food  availability for poor urban (or o ther  non-agri- 
cultural) h o useh o ld s  turns on price / incom e relationships. A ttem p ts  
to hold food prices d ow n  by sq u eez ing  growers are counter-produc­
tive (especially  if grow ers are actually sq u e ezed ,  less so  if they simply  
use parallel m arkets)  because  they reduce supply and either result in 
higher effect ive  prices to low -in co m e consum ers  or in u n m anageable  
import and subsidy bills. H igher rural productivity and larger  
supplies are much more likely to reduce real urban food  prices. 
T h erefore ,  the concentration  must be on raising in co m es  through  
more, and m ore p ro d u c t iv e 17 em p loy m en t/se lf -em p loy m en t .  H ow  
to do so is the basic quest ion  and o n e  need ing  data (on  what is 
produced how  and on  what the actual incom e sources o f  low -incom e  
sub-Saharan African h ou seh o ld s  are, as well as on technical and 
institutional p roduction /em ploym ent/productiv ity  possibilit ies) ,  
plus a coh eren t approach (not treating ‘appropriate tech n o log y ’ or 
‘the informal sec tor ’ as iso lated , h o m o g e n o u s  artifacts which they are 
not) linked to a system atic  attempt to treat em ploym ent/d istr ibu­
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tion and production/productivity issues as joint goals and program­
ming exercises ,  not separate or alternative ones.
The World E m ploym ent Programme and subsequent African basic 
needs mission studies do provide a foundation for devising contextual  
approaches on these lines. T he main o b s t a c l e s - o n c e  better data bases  
are built -  w ould appear to be political (the urban poor in sub-Saharan  
Africa are neither represented in enough  governing sub-class coa li­
tions nor enough  o f  a threat to their survival to receive priority 
attention in many countries)  and intellectual (the depth and extent o f  
urban poverty is still not fully c om p reh en d ed ,  the limits o f  m odernisa­
tion approaches are only beginning to be perceived , the som ew hat  
faddy, sloppy and romantic approaches o f  som e  ‘intermediate  
technology' and ‘informal sector' true believers have created a climate  
o f  scepticism). T he key crisis forcing rethinking is the growing  
realisation that with 3 per cent to 4 per cent annual econom ically  active  
population growth to the end o f  the century, em p loy m ent  growth  
outside peasant agriculture and the large-scale, capital intensive  
enterprise sector is essentia l .  E nhanced  productivity and greater  
production, on the on e  hand, give the possibility o f  having effective  
urban consum er access to food  and basic consum er good s and, on the 
other, rural producer access  to basic consum er good s and agricultural  
inputs. Both non-agricultural workers and peasants need  to becom e  
less poor and to have incentives for raising productivity (and working  
longer) to raise m arketed output o f  goo d s  and services.
S even th ,  universal access to basic services (health , education , water  
and production support such as research and extens ion  related to the 
two preceding priorities) within a finite time period (even  if that must  
be up to twenty or tw enty-f ive years) needs  to be seen  as an 
anti-poverty, food  production , productive em p loy m en t  and human  
condition priority. Poor p e o p le ,  especially  w o m en  and indigenous  
minorities, do  benefit disproportionately  from broadening access  
because when access is constricted they are the on es  excluded.  
Literacy, nutrition, health and reduction o f  time spent collecting water  
are critical to  enhancing the ability to work harder and more  
productively now and over  t i m e .1* T o  articulate such priorities into  
costed , sustainable programm atic form is not impossible if: (a) 
non-essentials are cut out (e .g .  via basic drug lists); (b) there is a real 
priority in personnel and policy allocation given to doing so. The  
obstacles are -  especially  for health and water -  intellectual and 
political.  Low-cost/universal access services are only now building up 
a cadre o f  professionals ,  a body o f  literature and a degree  o f
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respectability even  rem otely  resem bling that behind 'state o f  the art' 
approaches w h o se  costs are such as to render them largely non-func­
tional or practical only  on a limited access basis in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Piped water to houses  and high quality curative m edicine do appeal 
directly to  political decis ion-takers and civil servants (w ho  use and -  
reasonably enou gh  -  want to  have them ). T he balance in the 
intellectual d ia logue is shifting towards low-cost/universal access; 
the political self-interest obstacle  is very real and o ften  very intractable  
in most o f  sub-Saharan Africa.
E ighth, basic survival and support m echanism s are n eed ed  because  
em ergen c ies  will continue to arise. People  matter and the view  o f  
Nassau Senior that the Irish fam ine would  not kill enou gh  p eop le  to  
achieve adequate  structural adjustment o f  population to land is not an 
acceptable  political e co n o m ic  position  today. A gain  there is a 
perfectly respectable  production case -  the reduction o f  dislocation  
caused by unforeseen  and unprepared for em ergen cies  could  have a 
high pay-off in reducing their im m ediate  and subsequent negative  
impact on growth. The problem  is in devising approaches which do  
m eet survival and preservation o f  self-rehabilitation potential needs,  
while  being financially and institutionally feasible in specific sub-Sa­
haran African c o n te x t s .Iv A  crucial set relate to food  (see Reutlinger,  
1985; W orld B ank, 1986). Pre-planned food for work program m es  
(urban as well as rural) operating at som e level continuously  but 
capable o f  being stepped  up nationally or locally when required are an 
exam p le .  S o ,  w here technically and financially feas ib le ,  are food  
reserves linked to minim um  buying price safety nets for peasant  
producers in bum per crop years. Such an approach would  also avert 
the danger o f  fo od  aid so  depress ing d om estic  crop prices in goo d  years 
as to reverse the production revival -  a danger which is exacerbated  by 
the long lag b e tw een  need  and supply o f  food  aid usually resulting in 
large deliveries in the six m onths after d om estic  supplies have b ec o m e  
a d e q u a te .2" A  related approach applies to  submarginal 
argicultural-pastoral area residents. Here production returns to 
com bin ed  input and em ergen cy  relief ( including food  for work)  
program m es may well be low and the potential for sustained  
productivity increases problem atic .  H o w ev er ,  in practice there is often  
n ow here e lse  the human beings in these areas can go. If any value is 
placed on their survival and welfare, cost efficient program m es to 
ensure it are need ed . E con o m ic  growth a lone cannot proceed fast 
enou gh  to end chronic food  insecurity for these p eop le .  Both because  
their lives do matter and because  chronic food insecurity reduces their
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productivity yet further, specific interventions in their favour -  
including improving their production capacity, providing additional 
incom e generating possibilities (e .g .  seasonal works program m es) and 
em ergen cy  food and production input distribution -  are needed  
(R eutl inger , 1985).
Ninth, environm ental and eco log ica l protection should be rescued  
from its E uropean/N orth  A m erican  upper middle class origins and 
related to the struggle against poverty and for sustainable production.  
N eed  can be as damaging environm entally  as greed but cannot be dealt  
with by the sam e instruments. For exam ple ,  deforestation  (m ore  
accurately denudation  by stripping all tree and bush cover) is 
disastrous in its impact on  productivity and in its contribution to  
desertification ( loosely  def in ed ) ,  erosion  and dust bowls. It also  
increases the burdens on w o m en  and girls (and reduces their ability to  
grow crops, attend sch oo l ,  secure medical attention , improve  
environm ental sanitation). If it is caused by land-mining f a r m e r s - e .g .  
western Sudanese  m echanised  sorghum farming -  or forest ravaging  
loggers, then financial and criminal sanctions are relevant. But if -  as 
in a majority o f  the most critical sub-Saharan African cases -  it is 
caused by an increasing population practising shorter rotations and  
needing to collect (for h ousehold  provisioning or sale to urban areas)  
fuel and building materials, such measures are both normatively  
inappropriate and certain to fail. Imprisoning or hanging every bush  
cutter from Timbuktu to G a o  or M wanza to Shinyanga is hardly a 
plausible answer to neo-desertif ication  in Mali or dust bowl d e v e lo p ­
ment in Tanzania. Tree planting (encouraged  by extension  services  
but basically carried out by rural residents and/or urban fuel oriented  
producer co-operatives) and alternative fuel deve lop m en t  would  
appear to be the only practicable basic answ ers21 even  if both require 
time and patience to build up an adequate ,  self-sustaining basis.
T enth ,  budgetary balance should be restored primarily by increas­
ing revenue, not cutting services. In sub-Saharan Africa, revenue to  
G D P  ratios vary but so m e  are almost incredibly low even  for very  
low -incom e countries. Universal access basic services cannot be 
provided primarily on a profit-making basis both because large 
portions o f  them  can operate  only at a ‘loss' and because external  
eco n om ies  are large. Within revenue augm entation , attention should  
be focused on se lective  (progressive to well above  the poverty line) 
indirect taxes and on progressive direct taxes which are in practice at 
least midly redistributive on both the revenue and -  more particularly  
-  the expenditure side. F ees on limited access , high cost services (e .g .
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household  water con n ect ion s ,  above  average use hou seh o ld  e lectr ic­
ity and water bills, above  average health facility space and diet  
provision, specialist medical treatment) are at least as justif iable on  
this basis as luxury con su m er  good s  taxes and are often  fairly easy  
and low cost to collect. Charges for basic services are more  
problem atic .  U n less  a quick, effective waiver system at contact point  
can be devised  and op erated ,  poor p eo p le ,  and especially  their  
children, will be excluded . If fees  can be seen  to relate to  services  
(e .g .  a biannual b oreh o le  overhaul fee raised com m unally  and paid  
w hen -  and if -  the overhaul takes place; local contribution  o f  
agricultural work or food  to allow a primary health care w orker to do  
health work without destroying the family nutritional base) ,  they can  
help mobilise  resources, increase com m unity  support and reduce net 
central g overn m en t  cost. O th erw ise ,  they will be very unpopular in a 
context o f  fragile and often  interrupted services. Large num bers o f  
small charges have high co llection  costs  -  not least in skilled  
personnel time if, for ex am p le ,  nurses are ex p ected  to collect  
hundreds o f  small oral rehydration salts or vaccination fees  as part o f  
their daily w o r k .22
E leventh ,  w ithout participation by poor p eop le  no anti-poverty  
program m e will be fully successful even  in material terms. T he  case  
for participation in production and resource mobilisation (e .g .  
self-help  inputs o f  labour, materials, even  cash into basic service and  
infrastructure provision) is presumably self-evident. W hat is less 
accepted  is that poor p eop le  need  to participate in program m e  
design , o n go in g  m anagem ent and m onitoring/evaluation . T he  
reasons are not romantic -  poor p eop le  do have k n o w led ge  about  
their own n eeds  and capabilit ies which experts  do not; participation  
in production and ‘ta k e-u p ’ o f  services is related to  w h eth er  they do  
correspond  and are responsive to  users’ n eed s  and preferences;  
participation can create incentives for officials to be m ore responsive  
to poor p eo p le  (a not inconsiderable factor in program m e success,  
h ow ever  g oo d  or weak the initial design); self-help  resource m obilisa­
tion is practicable only  if those w ho are to m obilise  the resources  
believe  their use is appropriate , for their benefit and at least partially 
under their control.  T he political and institutional obstacles  to 
participation (and the real,  if partial and limited, su ccesses  in 
o vercom in g  them ) d o  not need  rehearsing and are not limited to 
sub-Saharan Africa. T hey  need  to be seen  as conflicts to be 
con ta ined , c ircum vented  or overco m e not as given and im mutable  
barriers to action.
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Participation -  and accountability -  pose special problem s for 
external bodies including multilateral, bilateral and voluntary aid or 
develop m en t agencies .  This is true even when they are intellectually  
com m itted  to participation and to accountability to intended ben efi­
ciaries. First, almost by definition their personnel are ‘outs iders’ 
usually with fairly brief country experience  and broad perception gaps  
or distance from host govern m ent officials and intellectuals, let alone  
African peasants, urban slum dw ellers ,  w om en  and children. Second ,  
their structures o f  accountability run (usually hierarchically) through  
their own institution to its policy-m akers and those to w hom  it is 
accountable, not to host governm ents  and through them to ordinary  
Africans, much less directly to  the latter. In a sense  these tensions are 
not fully soluble (barring participatory, accountab le , e ffective  world  
governm ent which, how ever  desirable, cannot reasonably be posed  as 
a side condit ion for the struggle against poverty in Africa). H o w ev er ,  
posing them and facing them squarely is potentia lly  a necessary first 
step towards reducing tensions to m anageable  levels, improving  
host-agency relationships and to avoid ing the escalation o f  tensions  
into antagonistic contradictions and the deterioration o f  dia logue into  
accusatory rhetoric.
T w elfth , while any strategy for overcom in g  poverty must be based  
on the actions o f  poor p eo p le  and poor countries in sub-Saharan  
Africa, if it is to have a real chance o f  sustainable success,  external  
support is critical. T he resources available dom estically  are too  limited  
and the ex o g e n o u s  shocks too  great for any strategy d epending  wholly  
on dom estic  resources to be more than problem atic  in results, or more  
than excruciatingly slow in paying o ff  (especially  for its intended  
beneficiaries and participants). T he  need  for real resource -  including  
know ledge -  transfers (from other d eve lop in g  countries as well as from  
industrial on es)  is as great in respect to the broader as to the narrower  
aspects o f  structural adjustment.
A V A L E D I C T O R Y  N O T E
The struggle against poverty -  and especially  against despairing  
acceptance that the fight is inevitably and irretrievably lost -  in 
sub-Saharan Africa today is w aged  in an unpropitious context .  But it is 
not an impossible context .  Even more fundam ental,  poor Africans and  
those concerned  with them have only that context and its present  
realities, limitations and potentials from which to begin. Past
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experience in the struggle against poverty d oes  not suggest that the 
N ew  Jerusalem can be achieved  nor that partial successes  o n ce  won  
will be easily or perm anently  sustainable. But nor d oes  it suggest either  
that nothing can be d on e  or that nothing can be d on e  until production  
problem s are largely o v ercom e.  Strategies o f  structural adjustment  
combining production and distribution, productivity and raising poor  
h ou seh o ld s’ in com es,  fo od  balance and external balance, fiscal 
balance and progress towards universal access to basic services -  and 
their partial and gradual articulation and im plem entation  -  are within  
human reach generally  and within African reach specifically.
Notes
1. The attempt to separate technical and normative, production and 
distribution issues in applied econom ics is a fairly recent heresy or fad 
following about twenty centuries during which they were viewed as 
integrally interrelated.
2. See, for example.  Rose (ed .)  1985; Green (ed .)  1985a; Ndegwa,  
Mureithi and Green (eds) 1985; World Bank 1984.
3. The most complete general example is usually seen as being World Bank,  
1981, o f  which Allison and Green published a detailed review and 
critique in 1983.
4. Governors som etimes did, by the nature of  their posts,  take a more 
territorially self-contained view with som e impact on territorial, but 
much less on overall, colonial policy.
5. A reading of  a random selection o f  colonial b luebooks, reports, minutes  
and semi-analytical pieces -  including Fabian ones on endeavours such as 
the post-1945 groundnut schem es -  rapidly brings home the colonial  
econom y in the service o f  the metropolitan econom y focus, as opposed to 
African welfare or even overall territorial developm ent,  of  colonial 
conceptualisation even when dealing with topics such as wages,  
employment or peasant production. Again som e governors -  for 
example.  Sir Gordon Guggisberg in the G old Coast and Lord L u g a r d  in 
Nigeria -  were partial exceptions even if rather technocratic and 
paternalistic in their approach to the welfare of  Africans and concep­
tually shaky in their delineation o f  how to expand territorial production.
6. In German East Africa (Tanzania) examination o f  German tombstones  
suggests that diseases killed at least one German per mile of  rail built, 
while West Africa’s European health condition was as much described as 
caricatured by the tag ‘The Bight o f  Benin where many go in; but few 
com e out again’.
7. Unpublished Tanzania data suggest a 3 to 2 ratio of minimum  
wage-consuming power to that of  the average peasant household;
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scattered West African estimates include several of  the same order in the 
mid-1970s. Much higher estimates usually compare peasant cash incomes  
with all urban income earners or value peasant self-provisioning in food as 
farmgate prices and worker food at urban retail prices, both of which 
distort real consuming power differentials.
8. Centred on the ILO’s World Employment Programme and Basic N eed s’ 
conceptualisation (ILO, 1976) and the World Bank's ‘Absolute Poverty’ 
conceptualisation and projects towards its eradication.
9. In fact, in most countries of  sub-Saharan Africa, a fairly steady post-1970 
increase in policies aimed at enhancing growth of  food production backed 
bv generally increased resource allocations have paralleled a worsening 
achieved output growth trend, despite grower price/urban wage terms of  
trade shifts in favour of  domestic food over most o f  the period. There are 
exceptions and it is probable that the causal relationship runs from the 
negative output trend to the policy/resource packages and not vice versa, 
but even on the most favourable reading policy was not in fact effective and 
resource allocations were not efficient in production pay-off terms.
10. See sources cited at note 2, especially Green (ed.)  1985a (contributions  
by S. Please and R. H. Green) and World Bank 1984.
11. The accuracy of  these data is certainly open to question. Eighty per cent 
averages taken literally would imply starvation was rampant among at 
least the bottom fifth of  the food distribution, and 68 per cent would 
suggest half the people were in the grip o f  a major famine. There is some  
reason to believe FA O  (and national) estimates in some countries 
understate food availability, and that up to a point low height and weight 
represent adaptation to conditions of  low food availability which do  
reduce minimum nutritional levels consistent with health. However, there 
is no reason to doubt the pattern of  declining availability shown in many 
cases for over a decade and for almost all since the late 1970s. Equally, 
adaptation cannot explain the high and rising levels o f  clinical malnutri­
tion in children which are based on less globalistic criteria, nor explain 
away the very real micro and qualitative evidence of  chronic inability to 
work hard, to study effectively, to benefit from health care which are 
reported, even under non-famine conditions, in most sub-Saharan 
African countries.
12. Thus northern and upper Ghana are usually perceived as food deficit 
areas. In nutritional terms they most certainly are. But they are 
substantial net food (yams, groundnuts, cattle and to a lesser extent 
millet and guinea corn) exporters to the rest of  Ghana and to Burkina 
Faso, except in the most severely drought affected years because most 
peasant households have no alternative way of  meeting basic cash 
purchase requirements.  (The regional rice surplus is less relevant to the 
argument as it comes from land extensive, capital intensive, large, 
mechanised farms not peasant growers).
13. Perceptions may be w r o n g - s e e ,  e .g . ,  note 1 2 -  but if acted on they do have 
objective results and are a real cause o f  decisions.
14. In more technical terms poer people can be expected to have high positive 
time and risk avoidance preferences. The implicit internal logic of structural 
adjustment programmes often calls for low preferences on both counts.
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15. Arguably such shifts -  especially within health -  are incorporated in both 
Zimbabwean and Tanzanian structural adjustment policies. However, in 
neither case is the shift the result o f  clear macro articulation and since 
neither Zimbabwe nor Tanzania has secured World Bank structural 
adjustment loans (nor a sustained IMF high credit tranche stabilisation 
agreement), there is a tendency to view their policies as not constituting 
structural adjustment. Both have been atypical in perceiving structural 
adjustment as a precondition for full stabilisation, not vice versa, even  
though both accept that initial imbalance reduction is necessary for 
structural adjustment to be effective. In Zimbabwe, 1984-5 results 
suggest substantial success in stabilisation and some in structural 
adjustment, whereas in Tanzania substantial 1981-5 progress in 
structural adjustment has been rendered less than fully effective by 
distinctly limited success in attempts to reduce external and domestic  
resource imbalances.
16. For a programmatic sketch see Daniel,  Lipton and Green, in Green (ed.)  
1985a.
17. Higher productivity is basic -  in the context o f  most informal sectors in 
sub-Saharan Africa -  to higher real incomes. Reduction o f  exploitation  
may often also be necessary, but until they are able to raise their 
productivity most informal sector em ployees/self-em ployed cannot 
achieve minimum adequate household incomes, no matter how fairly 
they are paid for what they produce.
18. Interestingly, the World Bank’s variant o f  the ‘new conventional  
wisdom’ has never fully lost sight o f  this point and has recently begun to 
reassert it. Som e o f  the production oriented justifications of  education  
and health are rather distressingly formulated -  they would make equal 
sense if the ‘objects’ discussed were machines or cattle -  but the 
underlying point that the productionist case reinforces the human 
concern one for basic services is an important and powerful one.
19. Contexts -  not the sub-Saharan African context. For exam ple,  food  
stamps for poor households might be a fiscally and administratively 
feasible food security approach in Mauritius but pretty clearly not in -  say 
-  Mauretania. Similarly, large inter-year grain storage may make little 
sense in Botswana which is bordered by two large grain exporters and has 
a relatively satisfactory foreign exchange position; in Zambia, both 
foreign exchange constraints and the need to restructure the econom y  
away from mining point in the other direction.
20. This may be unfair to decision-takers. With crop yields uncertain until 
harvest and the procurement/shipment time required long, it is 
prudent not to close down food aid (or other import) pipelines 
prematurely. H owever, the same cure of  minimum grower prices and 
reserve stocks would fit equally well to alleviate the problems resulting 
from such prudence.
21. The role o f  better stoves is controversial. Those developed are with few 
exceptions so unpopular as to suggest serious design or overlooked  
side-effect weaknesses. In any case, substituting a purchased stove for 
three stones to save wood produced (collected) by direct labour input is 
not a practical prescription for poor rural households to follow.
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22. The critique on the grounds of  collection cost is far from radical -  it is 
standard Treasury practitioner wisdom aggregated from experience.  
That on indirect costs to unpaid collectors is not one Treasuries are so 
prone to make, but is one they recognise and to a degree accept -  
precisely because their experience is that heavy collection burdens on 
non-Treasury institutions or enterprises result in protests, the need to 
pay collection fees and/or very poor collection rates. Many o f  the 
detailed fee schemes proposed appear to be ‘academic’ or ‘ideological’ 
in the perjorative sense -  it is hard to suppose their authors have any 
knowledge o f  revenue management and collection realities, and on 
occasion charging the user seems to be the goal in and of  itself 
whether the net revenue secured is substantial, negligible or even  
negative. Perhaps the author is biased because for nine years he was a 
practising Treasury civil servant responsible inter alia for devising  
administratively feasible and cost efficient revenue measures and 
structures.
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